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I. INTRODUCTION
To maintain legitimacy and stability, a government must have access to a reliable
source of revenue. Taxes are the lifeblood that sustains a government. They fund
student loans, provide equipment for the men and women serving in our military,
and maintain our highways. All these things develop and protect our society. As far
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back as 1931, the United States Supreme Court has enforced the principle that the
executive branch of the federal government must be unimpaired in its ability to
collect taxes owed; otherwise, the government could be undermined by citizens who
attempt to delay or evade their obligation to pay taxes.1
Taxpayers have always been permitted, of course, to dispute the amount of their
liability; however, until recently, taxpayers had little opportunity to dispute the
method employed by the IRS to collect an assessed tax. In 1998, Congress enacted
the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA of 1998),
which represents a dramatic departure from this principle.2 Among its provisions the
RRA of 1998 provided that taxpayers may demand a hearing before the IRS as to the
proposed collection method and may also suggest alternatives, such as installment
agreements or offers-in-compromise. A dissatisfied taxpayer could then appeal the
IRS’s determination on the matter either to the United States Tax Court or the
federal district court, jurisdiction depending on the type of tax involved.3
Unfortunately, these collection due process statutory provisions are short on
details, and the IRS and the courts have struggled to create procedures that comport
with the spirit of the law within the confines of their respective authorities. The
United States Tax Court is an Article I court Congress created to provide taxpayers
with a forum to protest certain alleged tax deficiencies prior to their payment. The
Tax Court has been uncomfortable with its new appellate role and has tried to create
a judicial review process by analogizing collection due process appeals to the Tax
Court’s deficiency procedures. However, when the Tax Court hears deficiency
cases, it acts as a trial court and hears the matter de novo. When the Tax Court hears
collection due process appeals, it acts as an appellate court reviewing agency action
to determine its propriety—an entirely different role and process from deficiency
cases.
The district courts turned to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and
traditional administrative law jurisprudence to fill in the gaps Congress left in the
enabling legislation.4 The Tax Court did not. As a result, the two courts applied
different review standards and different rules regarding evidence the courts would
consider during the appeal.5 Therefore, despite the fact that the same enabling

1

See Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).

2

Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 3401, 112 Stat. 685, 747-50.
3

When first enacted, the RRA of 1998 split jurisdiction for collection due process
appeals between the United States Tax Court and the federal district courts. In 2006,
Congress amended the law and vested the United States Tax Court with exclusive jurisdiction.
Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 855(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1019 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1) (2006)) (providing exclusive jurisdiction in the United
States Tax Court for all collection due process appeals regardless of which court had
jurisdiction over the underlying tax liability).
4

See, e.g., Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144 (1st Cir. 2005); Living Care Alternatives
of Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2005).
5
For example, as discussed infra note 43, both courts agreed that the standard should be
abuse of discretion with regard to appeals that involved only the method the IRS proposed to
use to collect the tax. However, the Tax Court applied this standard in a different way from
the district courts. Also, the Tax Court did not confine itself to the record created during the
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legislation empowered both courts to hear taxpayer appeals, the two courts
conducted the appeals in significantly different ways that affected taxpayer rights.
Although the Tax Court now has sole jurisdiction over collection due process
appeals, its position remains problematic. In the absence of legislation specifying
how a court is to review agency action, the APA and traditional administrative law
jurisprudence step into the breach and provide structure for the court’s review
process. As a result, participants in the process are assured of consistency and
predictability regarding the review process, thus rendering the process fairer. The
Tax Court thwarts these expectations when it creates its own rules of procedure and
evidence when acting as a reviewing court.
Commentators have argued that the Tax Court should fill in the gaps in its
statutory authority for collection due process appeals by turning to traditional
administrative law jurisprudence, including the APA, which suggestion the Tax
Court has resisted despite the fact that the federal district court did so.6 The majority
of the Tax Court insists that it has never been subject to administrative law
jurisprudence or the APA, nor could it be. Most of the courts of appeals that have
considered the issue have held that the Tax Court is bound by the APA and
traditional administrative law jurisprudence when the Tax Court is acting as a
reviewing court. An exploration of the Tax Court’s and the APA’s history reveals
that the Tax Court can be, and should be, subject to the APA and traditional
administrative law jurisprudence when it acts as a reviewing court of agency action.
Part II of the article explains how the collection due process administrative
hearings and appeals therefrom operate and some of the difficulties that have arisen
with these appeals. Part III reviews the history of the Tax Court: how it began as a
division of the Internal Revenue Service, became an independent agency, and then
finally evolved into an Article I court. Part IV explores how the APA came into
being and the initial questions as to its potential application to the predecessors of
the Tax Court. Part V then considers and rejects the argument that the APA cannot
apply to the Tax Court either because it is an Article I court or because it is a court of
specialized, as opposed to general, jurisdiction.
II. COLLECTION DUE PROCESS HEARINGS AND APPEALS
A. The Internal Revenue Service’s Assessment and Collection Authority and
Procedures
1. Assessment Authority and Procedures
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to impose and collect taxes;7
although Congress continues to be the authority that imposes taxes, the IRS actually
IRS level administrative appeal, but rather, permitted taxpayers to introduce new evidence
during appeal.
6
See generally Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax
Collection Decisions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429 (2008); Christine K. Lane, On-The-Record
Review of CDP Determinations: An Examination of Policy Reasons Encouraging Judges to
Stick to the Administrative Record, 6 FLA. ST. U. BUS. L. REV. 149 (2007); Nick A. Zotos,
Service Collection Abuse of Discretion: What is the Appropriate Standard of Review and
Scope of the Record in Collection Due Process Appeals?, 62 TAX L. 223 (2008).
7

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XVI.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010

3

606

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:603

has the authority to assess and collect taxes. Generally, the Internal Revenue Service
cannot commence collection proceedings until the tax has been assessed.8
Assessment is the recording of the taxpayer’s liability in the office of the Secretary
of the Treasury.9 The Internal Revenue Service is permitted to assess a tax after a
taxpayer has filed a tax return showing a tax is owed10 or after the Tax Court has
found the taxpayer is liable for a deficiency in income, estate, gift, and certain excise
taxes.11 An assessment is the functional equivalent of a judgment against a
taxpayer.12
The Tax Court provides the taxpayer with an opportunity to receive preassessment judicial review of some tax liabilities.13 In the case of income, estate,
gift, and certain excise taxes, if the Internal Revenue Service determines that there is
a deficiency in the tax shown on the return, or if no return was filed, the Internal
Revenue Service must send the taxpayer a notice of deficiency.14 Within ninety days
after the notice is mailed, the taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a de
novo re-determination of the deficiency.15 When conducting a deficiency hearing,
the Tax Court is not confined to and does not rely on the administrative record
compiled by the Internal Revenue Service in its dealings with the taxpayer. Instead,
the Tax Court acts as a trial court, hears the matter de novo, and determines for itself
the taxpayer’s correct amount of tax due. Although the Tax Court determines the
taxpayer’s liability in a deficiency hearing, the Tax Court hears no evidence and
makes no findings as to the manner in which the Internal Revenue Service will
collect the tax if it is found to be owed.
The Internal Revenue Service is prohibited from assessing or collecting the
disputed tax during the ninety-day notice period; and if the taxpayer files a petition
with the Tax Court, until the Tax Court’s decision is final.16 If the taxpayer fails to
file a timely petition with the Tax Court, or if the Tax Court determines that there is
a deficiency, the Internal Revenue Service may assess the tax and then begin
8
I.R.C. §§ 6201, 6203, 6303, 6322 (2006). The Internal Revenue Service can
immediately assess a tax and commence collection if it determines that the tax is in jeopardy.
9

Id. § 6203.

10

Id. § 6201(c).

11

Id. § 6213.

12

Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm
Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2004).
13

I.R.C. § 6214.

14
Internal Revenue Code section 6212 directs the Secretary to send the taxpayer a notice
of deficiency. Section 6211 defines deficiency. A deficiency arises if the Internal Revenue
Service believes that the taxpayer has understated, on the return, the correct amount of tax
owed. A deficiency does not include the situation where the taxpayer has indicated on the
return that a certain amount of tax is owed, but simply fails to include the payment. Id.
15

Section 6213(a) states that a taxpayer has ninety days to file a petition; if the taxpayer
resides in another country, the time to file a petition is one hundred and fifty days. Section
6214 provides that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to re-determine the deficiency after a timely
petition has been filed.
16

Id. § 6213(a).
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collection proceedings.17 The Tax Court is the sole pre-assessment judicial forum
available to taxpayers and, as noted above, is only available to contest income,
estate, gift, and certain excise taxes.
If the tax is one not subject to the Tax Court’s jurisdiction, such as a payroll tax
or tax that the taxpayer has acknowledged on the return to be due (and merely has
not paid), the Internal Revenue Service may immediately assess the tax and
commence collection if the taxpayer fails to pay.18
Other than as provided in I.R.C. sections 6320 and 6330, discussed below, the
only relief from liability to which a taxpayer is entitled after assessment is rendered
post-payment.
If the taxpayer disputes that he is liable for the assessed tax, he nevertheless must
first pay the tax and then file an administrative claim with the Internal Revenue
Service for a refund.19 If the Internal Revenue Service denies the claim, the taxpayer
may then file suit for refund in either the district court or the court of federal
claims.20 However, the suit will address only the existence and the amount of the
taxpayer’s liability; the suit will not address any methods the Internal Revenue
Service may have employed to collect the tax. Prior to enactment of the RRA of
1998, taxpayers had little recourse with respect to IRS debt collection methods such
as liens and levies.21
17

I.R.C. § 6213(c) provides for assessment in the event the taxpayer fails to file a timely
petition. I.R.C. § 6215(a) provides that the tax may be assessed after the Tax Court’s
determination of a deficiency becomes final as provided in I.R.C. § 7481. However, I.R.C. §
7482 permits the taxpayer to appeal the Tax Court’s decision to the United States Courts of
Appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), and such
review shall be to the same extent as decisions of district courts in civil actions tried without a
jury. The United States Supreme Court may review the appellate court’s decision upon
certiorari.
18

Id. § 6201.

19

I.R.C. § 6511 provides that the taxpayer must file an administrative claim for refund
three years from when the return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid,
whichever is later. If the taxpayer did not file a return, he or she must file a claim for refund
within two years from the time the tax was paid.
20

I.R.C. § 7422(a) states that no civil suit for refund may be commenced unless a taxpayer
has first filed an administrative claim for refund. I.R.C. § 6532(a) provides that the suit
cannot be commenced until six months after the taxpayer has filed an administrative claim for
refund, unless the Internal Revenue Service rejects the claim earlier. After the Internal
Revenue Service rejects the claim or six months elapse, the taxpayer must file suit within two
years of that event.
21

The United States Supreme Court has held specifically that the collection of tax debt by
means of a lien is constitutional. United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713,
721 (1985); see also Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
The right of the United States to collect its internal revenue by summary
administrative proceedings has long been settled. Where . . . adequate opportunity is
afforded for a later judicial determination of the legal rights, summary proceedings to
secure prompt performance of pecuniary obligations to the government have been
consistently sustained.
Phillips, 283 U.S. at 595.
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It is important to note that a taxpayer is supposed to get only one chance to
dispute, in court, his tax liability.22 If the taxpayer avails himself of the Tax Court’s
pre-assessment/pre-payment deficiency procedures and loses, the taxpayer cannot
pay the tax and then file a suit for a refund.23 The Tax Court’s decision is res
judicata as to the taxpayer’s liability. If the tax was not one within the Tax Court’s
jurisdiction, or if the taxpayer chose not to file a petition with the Tax Court within
the ninety-day period after receiving the notice of deficiency, the taxpayer must pay
the tax and then avail himself of the refund procedures previously described.
2. Collection Authority and Procedures
Historically, the Internal Revenue Service has enjoyed broad collection powers
not subject to judicial review.24 The Internal Revenue Service is permitted to collect
a delinquent tax by summary administrative proceedings and, with only a few
exceptions,25 need not obtain a court order to take the taxpayer’s property. These
collection powers are buttressed by the Anti-Injunction statute,26 which prohibits a
taxpayer from obtaining a court injunction against assessment or collection, subject
to a few statutory exceptions contained therein.27

22

The collection due process appeals have changed this and enabled some taxpayers to
dispute their liability more than once in court. See Diane L. Fahey, The Tax Court’s
Jurisdiction over Due Process Collection Appeals: Is It Constitutional?, 55 BAYLOR L. REV.
453, 491-92 (2003).
23

I.R.C. § 6512(a) (“If the Secretary has mailed to the taxpayer a notice of deficiency . . .
and if the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court . . . no credit or refund . . . shall be
allowed . . . and no suit . . . for the recovery of any part of the tax shall be instituted in any
court . . . .”).
24

See Marilyn E. Phelan, A Summary of the Extensive Collection Powers of the Internal
Revenue Service, 9 VA. TAX REV. 405 (1990). Although Professor Phelan’s article predates
the enactment of the RRA of 1998, much of her discussion of the Internal Revenue Service’s
vast collection powers remains timely and is an extremely useful summary of the Internal
Revenue Service’s summons, enforcement, and collection powers. See also Camp, supra note
12, at 20-21.
25

For example, the IRS must obtain a warrant in order to enter into private residences to
seize assets (although a warrant is not required to seize property in public areas). See G.M.
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 358 (1977).
26

I.R.C. § 7421(a) (“Except as provided in sections 6015(e), 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a),
6225(b), 6246(b), 6330(e)(1), 6331(i), 6672(c), 6694(c), and 7426(a) and (b)(1), 7429(b), and
7436 . . . no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be
maintained in any court by any person . . . .”). Id.
27

One of the exceptions was discussed above. See supra text accompanying note 25. A
taxpayer may obtain an injunction if the Internal Revenue Service attempts to assess or collect
a tax during the ninety-day period that the notice of deficiency is pending or while the Tax
Court has jurisdiction over the deficiency proceeding. In addition, the United States Supreme
Court recognizes an exception to the Anti-Injunction statute and permits a taxpayer to obtain
injunctive relief if the taxpayer can demonstrate two factors: (1) irreparable harm, and (2)
certainty of success on the merits—a virtually impossible standard to satisfy. See Bob Jones
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737 (1974); Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,
370 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1962).
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After assessing the tax, the Internal Revenue Service must send the taxpayer a
notice informing him of the amount due and demanding payment.28 If the taxpayer
fails to pay the tax within ten days, the Internal Revenue Service sends the taxpayer
a notice of federal tax lien, which attaches to all of the taxpayer’s real and personal
property.29 The Internal Revenue Service may then proceed and levy on the
taxpayer’s property on which there is the federal tax lien30 except for certain exempt
property.31 The taxpayer must be notified of the intent to levy at least thirty days
prior to the levy,32 and this notice must advise the taxpayer, in “simple and
nontechnical terms,” of the procedures relating to a levy and sale of property,
available administrative appeals (including, most importantly, the right to a due
process collection appeal), and alternatives that might prevent the levy.33
3. IRS Administrative Level Collection Due Process Hearings
Unfortunately, I.R.C. section 6330 provides little guidance as to how the IRS
should conduct the administrative hearing or how the Tax Court should conduct
judicial review thereof. After some initial confusion and debate, the courts
determined that the hearings should be informal.34 At the administrative hearing, the
taxpayer may raise any relevant issue pertaining to the unpaid tax or the proposed
levy, including challenges to the appropriateness of the proposed collection action,
offers of collection alternatives such as installment agreements, or offers in
compromise.35 In addition to raising issues as to the proposed collection, the
taxpayer may dispute the underlying tax liability itself if the taxpayer either did not
receive the notice of deficiency or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute
the tax.36
28
See I.R.C. § 6303. The notice and demand must be sent within sixty days of
assessment. Id. § 6303(a). Although the Internal Revenue Service is obligated to send only
one notice and demand, in fact, the Internal Revenue Service sends several computergenerated notices before taking any further collection action. See also MICHAEL J. SALTZMAN,
IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 14.03[3] (rev. 2d ed. 2002).
29

Id. § 6321.

30

Id. § 6331(a).

31

I.R.C. § 6334 lists thirteen categories of items exempt from the levy. They include such
things as the taxpayer’s clothes, books, tools of trade, unemployment benefits, and disability
benefits. In addition, the Internal Revenue Service must obtain judicial permission to levy on
the taxpayer’s personal residence.
32

Id. § 6331(d)(1)-(2).

33

Id. § 6331(d)(4)(B)-(D).

34

See, e.g., Katz v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 329, 337 (2000) (noting that hearings before the
IRS’s Appeals division historically have been informal and, therefore, by analogy CDP
administrative hearings should also be informal); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1 (2006).
35

Id. § 6330(c)(2)(A).

36
Id. § 6330(c)(2)(B). The statute does not explain what is meant by “or did not otherwise
have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability.” Id. The I.R.C. has interpreted this as
meaning that the taxpayer did not have an opportunity to dispute the liability at a prior
conference with Appeals, either before the assessment (for example, during an audit) or after.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3)(vi)Q-E2-A-E2.
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The Appeals Officer is obligated to make a determination that all procedural
requirements have been met and all appropriate issues have been considered.
Further, the Appeals Officer must determine whether the proposed collection action
balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes against the taxpayer’s concern
that the collection be no more intrusive than necessary.37 When the Appeals Officer
makes his determination, he will send the taxpayer a Notice of Determination
letter.38
B. Judicial Review of IRS Collection Due Process Hearings
Internal Revenue Code section 6330(d)(1) merely provides that the taxpayer is
entitled to judicial review in the Tax Court. Congress failed to specify in the statute
the standard for review that the courts should apply when reviewing collection due
process appeals; however, the legislative history states that Congress intended for the
courts to consider appeals of the underlying tax liability on a de novo basis and to
consider appeals from the proposed collection on an abuse of discretion basis.39 The
Tax Court has adopted this standard.40
Because the collection due process (CDP) administrative hearings before the IRS
are informal, there is very little record available for the Tax Court to review. The
administrative record in CDP appeals usually contains the following: the CDP lien or
levy notice; the taxpayer’s request for a CDP hearing and any other correspondence;
the Appeals Officer’s history notes and Notice of Determination; the appeals
transmittal and case memoranda; a summary of the taxpayer’s account; any
documents submitted by the taxpayer after the date of the hearing request up until
the date of the Notice of Determination; and any tape recordings or transcriptions of
the hearing if made.41 Because the hearings are informal and not recorded, there is
usually no transcript of the proceedings available for court review on appeal.

37

I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3).

38

Treas. Reg. § 301.6630-1(e)(3)(vi)Q-E8-A-E8. “Taxpayers will be sent a dated Notice
of Determination by certified or registered mail.” Id.
39

H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 265 (1998).

Where the validity of the tax liability was properly at issue in the hearing, and where
the determination with regard to the tax liability is a part of the appeal, no levy may
take place during the pendency of the appeal. The amount of the tax liability will in
such cases be reviewed by the appropriate court on a de novo basis. Where the
validity of the tax liability is not properly part of the appeal, the taxpayer may
challenge the determination of the appeals officer for abuse of discretion. In such
cases, the appeals officer’s determination . . . will be reviewed using an abuse of
discretion standard of review.
Id.
40
Davis v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 35, 39 (2000). When the district courts had joint
jurisdiction with the Tax Court over collection due process appeals, the district courts also
adopted these standards. As shall be discussed below, there was a dichotomy in how the Tax
Court and the district courts actually applied the abuse of discretion standard with the district
courts applying abuse of discretion as it is traditionally interpreted under administrative law
jurisprudence and the Tax Court applying what really amounted to de novo review. Id.
41

See, e.g., Lane, supra note 6, at 155.
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Because the Tax Court does not consider itself bound by either traditional
administrative law jurisprudence or the APA, the Tax Court does not limit its
judicial review to the record created at the administrative hearing (the record rule).42
Instead, the Tax Court has permitted taxpayers to expand the record with testimony
on matters not considered by the Appeals Officer. In Robinette v. Commissioner,43
the Tax Court reiterated its position, which position the Tax Court has adhered to in
subsequent cases.44 After failing to pay almost one million dollars in taxes, Dr.
Robinette entered into an offer-in-compromise in 1995 with the IRS in which he
agreed to pay $100,000 in settlement of his tax liabilities and to file his income tax
returns for the next five years on a timely basis.45 If Dr. Robinette failed to file his
returns on a timely basis, the offer-in-compromise could be revoked and he would
again be liable for the full amount of his tax liability.46
Subsequently, he received an extension until October 15, 1999 to file his 1998
tax return.47 Dr. Robinette’s accountant, Mr. Coy, later testified before the Tax
Court that on October 15 he drove to Dr. Robinette’s home sometime between 8:45
p.m. and 9:00 p.m., returned to his office, sometime after 11:00 p.m. but before
12:00 a.m., where he affixed the appropriate amount of postage to the envelope
containing Dr. Robinette’s tax return, using a private postage meter in his office, and
then deposited the envelope in the U.S. Postal Service mailbox in his building. 48
On no less than three occasions, the IRS notified Dr. Robinette that it had not
received his 1998 tax return and warned him that the offer-in-compromise was in
jeopardy if he did not provide a copy.49 Although Dr. Robinette did not respond to
the IRS, he testified at the Tax Court that he gave these letters to Mr. Coy.50 The
IRS finally sent Dr. Robinette a letter informing him that the offer-in-compromise
was in default and then sent him a final notice of intent to levy. Mr. Coy timely
requested an administrative collection due process hearing before the IRS on the
grounds that Dr. Robinette did not owe the money.51
At the collection due process hearing, the only evidence the Appeals Officer
would consider for proof of mailing was a certified mail or registered mail receipt
and refused to consider Dr. Robinette’s pattern of asking for extensions and filing on
42

Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 94-95 (2004). The Tax Court acknowledges that
although the proper standard for review is abuse of discretion, the scope of review is,
essentially, de novo in that the Tax Court can hear new evidence. Id.
43

Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85 (2004).

44
Oropeza. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-094, discussed infra notes 67, 68 and
accompanying text.
45

Dr. Robinette had income tax liabilities for the years 1983 through 1991 and
employment tax liabilities for portions of 1988, 1989, and 1990 for a total liability of
$989,475. Robinette, 123 T.C. at 86.
46

Id. at 86-87.

47

Id. at 87.

48

Id. at 88.

49

Id. at 89-90.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 90.
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October 15, as he had done in previous years.52 The Appeals Officer issued a Notice
of Determination to Dr. Robinette declaring that the offer-in-compromise was in
default and that collection proceedings would continue.53 Dr. Robinette filed a
timely appeal with the Tax Court contending, inter alia, that the Appeals Officer
should have considered Mr. Coy’s testimony and records. The Tax Court agreed,
but rather than remand the matter back to the IRS, the Tax Court allowed Dr.
Robinette to introduce this evidence into the record stating that “we are not limited
by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and our review is not limited to the
administrative record.”54 The Tax Court noted that it had so held in a number of
previous cases regarding requests by taxpayers to supplement the administrative
record created at the IRS hearing.
Since the enactment of section 6330, the Court has applied our
traditional de novo procedures in deciding whether an Appeals officer
abused his or her discretion in determining to proceed with collection. At
trials under section 6330 when reviewing for abuse of discretion, the
Court has received into evidence testimony and exhibits that were not
included in the administrative record. See, e.g., Wells v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2003-234 (taxpayer’s testimony admissible at trial when he
was represented by counsel and taxpayer was not present at hearing);
Maloney v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-143 (taxpayers presented
numerous letters sent to Commissioner asking him to recalculate their
FICA taxes as evidence of claimed overpayments) . . . Gougler v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-185 (Court considered two documents
at trial that were not presented to Appeals officer); Holliday v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-67 (Commissioner permitted to present
documents, records, and testimony at trial that was not part of
administrative record) . . . .55
The only federal district or appellate court case that the Tax Court cited in support of
its position was from the taxpayer’s appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Holliday.56
The Tax Court went on to observe that “[t]he APA has never governed
proceedings in the Court (or in the Board of Tax Appeals)”57 and cited in support a
52

Id. at 91.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 95.

55

Id. at 95-96.

56

Holliday v. Comm’r, 57 F.App’x 774 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit in an
unpublished opinion simply stated that “the ‘record review’ provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act . . . do not apply to the Tax Court.” In support of its position, the Ninth Circuit
relied on 5 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1), holding that the “APA does not apply where ‘a matter [is]
subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de novo in a court.’” Id. However, 5
U.S.C § 544(a)(1) dictates when an agency must conduct its hearings in accordance with
formal, trial-type procedures and which section goes on to provide that an agency is exempt
from using formal adjudication if the matter will be tried de novo in a court of law.
57

Robinette, 123 T.C. at 96.
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number of cases, including O’Dwyer v. Commissioner58 and Nappi v.
Commissioner.59 However, as shall be discussed more fully below, neither O’Dwyer
nor Nappi supports the Tax Court’s position.
Dr. Robinette appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which
reversed the Tax Court.60 Among other things, the Eighth Circuit held that the Tax
Court (1) should have adhered to the record rule when conducting its review of the
IRS’s actions,61 (2) is bound by the APA in this context,62 and (3) had misconstrued
O’Dwyer and Nappi.63
The Eighth Circuit’s position regarding the applicability of the record rule and
the APA to collection due process appeals dovetails with that of the First and Sixth
Circuit Courts of Appeals when the district courts shared jurisdiction over collection
due process appeals with the Tax Court. In Olsen v. United States,64 the taxpayer
argued that the district court was in error when it upheld the IRS’s determination that
the levy should proceed. The taxpayer argued that the district court should have
permitted him to conduct discovery while the collection due process appeal was
before the district court rather than limiting him to the administrative record created
at the IRS collection due process hearing. The First Circuit ruled against the
taxpayer, stating that the district court’s review was limited to the administrative
record, and if that record was inadequate, the appropriate course of action is to
remand the matter back to the agency for further proceedings rather than attempting
to supplement the administrative record with new evidence:
We turn next to Olsen’s argument that the district court erred in denying
his motion to conduct discovery and in limiting its review to the
administrative record. The Supreme Court has consistently stated that
review of administrative decisions is “ordinarily limited to consideration
of the decision of the agency . . . and of the evidence on which it was
based,” and that “no de novo proceeding may be held.” United States v.
Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 714-15, 83 S.Ct. 1409, 10 L.Ed.2d
652 (1963). “[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the
administrative record already in existence, not some new record made
initially in the reviewing court.” Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93
S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973). See also Florida Power & Light Co.
v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985)
(“The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA
standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706, to the agency decision based on the
record the agency presents to the reviewing court.”).
It is true the instant record is not of a formal adjudication. But an
administrative record was compiled and made available, reflecting the
58

O’Dwyer v. Comm’r, 266 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1959).

59

Nappi v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 282 (1972).

60

Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006).

61

Id. at 459-61.

62

Id. at 460 n.4.

63

Id. at 461.

64

Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144 (1st Cir. 2005).
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actions, contentions, and reasoning of those involved. And the Supreme
Court has made clear that the record rule extends to informal agency
adjudications. See, e.g., Lorion, 470 U.S. at 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598 (“The
APA specifically contemplates judicial review on the basis of the agency
record compiled in the course of informal agency action in which a
hearing has not occurred.”) . . . . In the event the administrative record is
found inadequate for judicial review, “the proper course, except in rare
circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or
explanation.” Id.; see also Carlo Bianchi, 373 U.S. at 718, 83 S.Ct. 1409
(remand “would certainly be justified where the department had failed to
make adequate provision for a record that could be subjected to judicial
scrutiny”) . . . .65
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Living Care Alternatives v. United
States,66 also held that the reviewing court should limit its review of the IRS’s action
to the record created during the administrative hearing.
Subsequently, the Tax Court decided Oropeza v. Commissioner,67 and the Tax
Court again determined that it was not bound by either the APA or traditional
administrative law jurisprudence when conducting judicial review of IRS
administrative-level collection due process hearings.68
The Tax Court places great reliance on its history as an entity, which,
historically, has reviewed on a de novo basis IRS determinations that a taxpayer
owes a tax, stating a number of times that the Tax Court and its predecessors have
never been subject to the APA. It is true that the Tax Court and its predecessors
have never been charged with the typical agency responsibilities of rulemaking or
investigation of taxpayer behavior, but rather only had adjudicatory duties. That
fact, however, is not dispositive of the question. Other agencies also operate in this
fashion.69 The position that the Tax Court and its predecessors have “always” been
65

Id. at 155.

66

Living Care Alternatives of Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2005).
The Sixth Circuit discussed Mesa Oil, Inc. v. United States, No. Civ.A. 00-B-851, 2000 WL
1745280, at *7 (D. Colo. 2000), where the district court held that the administrative record
was inadequate and remanded the matter back to the IRS for further proceedings. The Sixth
Circuit believed that the Mesa Oil district court had applied an overly rigorous standard of
review but also believed that the district court acted properly in remanding the matter to the
agency rather than attempting to supplement the record during the court proceedings. Living
Care Alternatives, 411 F.3d at 629.
67

Oropeza v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2008-094.

68

Id. at 4.

69

Tax enforcement is not the only area in which the Congress has deemed it wise to
separate out the enforcement and prosecutorial duties from the adjudicatory duties. In 1970,
Congress created two entities to implement occupational safety and health: (1) the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (which is located within the Department of
Labor), which makes policy, conducts investigations, and assesses penalties, and (2) the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (an independent commission), which
adjudicates contested assessments. Despite the fact that the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission is a stand alone entity and only charged with adjudicatory duties, no one
contends that it is, therefore, not an agency. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. § 651 (2006).
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considered exempt from traditional administrative law, and the APA specifically, is
somewhat simplistic and ignores the Tax Court’s own history, which reveals that
courts and executive officials questioned this contention a number of times.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT
A. Committee on Appeals and Review: Administrative Agency
Prior to enactment of the modern federal income tax, the federal government
derived most of its revenues from tariffs and customs duties on imports, from some
internal excise taxes (for example on the sale of alcohol and tobacco), and from the
sale of public lands.70 In 1913, Congress enacted the Internal Revenue Act of 1913
(1913 Act)71the predecessor to today’s federal income tax as now codified in Title
26 of the United States Code. The 1913 Act was relatively modest in its scope with
low rates and a generous exemption so that out of a population of 97 million, only
358,000 individual income tax returns were filed for the 1913 tax year.72 However,
in 1914, World War I (WWI) began in Europe, and, although the United States
would not officially enter the conflict until the spring of 1917, the United States
immediately experienced financial repercussions from the war as a result of (1)
reduced revenues from customs receipts due to trade reduction with Europe, and (2)
increased government expenditures as the United States made preparations to enter
the conflict.73 In response, Congress enacted the Revenue Acts of 1916,74 1917,75
and 191876 (collectively, WWI Revenue Acts), which raised tax rates and reduced
the exemption amount and also enacted the excess profits tax77 in an attempt to stem
war profiteering.78 Each one of these revenue measures added more complexity to
the ever-evolving new tax code and also increased the number of taxpayers who
were required to file returns so that by 1917, 3.5 million individuals filed income tax
returns, and by 1920, the number had increased to seven million.79
The federal government needed an agency to administer this new tax system. In
1861 and 1862, Congress had enacted legislation temporarily creating an income tax
70

HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 2
(1979). Prior to 1913, Congress enacted a federal income tax for two brief periods during our
country’s history: during the Civil War and at the turn of the nineteenth century, although
Congress had considered enacting an income tax at other times such as during the War of
1812. Id.
71
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. Several years earlier, in 1909, Congress had
enacted a federal income tax on corporations. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112.
72

DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 8.

73

Id. at 8-9.

74

Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756.

75

Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300.

76

Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057.

77

Act of Mar. 3, 1917, ch. 159, § 201, 39 Stat. 1000.

78

DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 9-10.

79

Id. at 10-12.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010

13

616

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:603

to finance the Civil War80 and also creating the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Bureau)
to administer the income tax.81 Although the income tax was repealed after the Civil
War, the Bureau remained in existence to administer what few internal revenue taxes
remained—such as on alcohol and tobacco—and to perform certain other
miscellaneous duties such as administering the bounty for United States sugar
producers, certifying Chinese laborers, and collecting the tax on opium and
oleomargarine.82
The Bureau struggled to keep up with its new duties imposed by the Act of 1913,
but when Congress enacted the WWI Revenue Acts, the Bureau was overwhelmed.
The Bureau felt compelled to audit every return that was filed while, at the same
time, the number of returns and the complexity of the tax code both had dramatically
increased within the space of a few years.83 Further exacerbating the problem, the
Bureau was hindered by the lack of trained personnel to audit the returns or answer
taxpayer questions. The Bureau made strenuous efforts to recruit auditors at a time
when the labor market was already reduced due to military recruitment; however,
each auditor required a training period of several months, and many auditors would
leave the Bureau within a short period of time to work in the more lucrative private
sector providing advice to taxpayers.84
In these first few years, as the Bureau experienced high turnover in its personnel
and endeavored to interpret the new, ever-changing tax code, it was not uncommon
for a taxpayer to be subject to multiple audits and assessed differing amounts for the
same tax year. Unfortunately, the various revenue acts failed to provide that
taxpayers should be given any advance notice of the new or changed assessments or
a hearing to question the alleged liability prior to payment. If the taxpayer failed to
pay, the Bureau could begin collection proceedings.85 Prior to the enactment of the

80

Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309; Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 89,
12 Stat. 432. See Joe Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative
History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 713 (2001).
81

Rev. Act, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 299 (1861).

82

DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 14.

83

Id. at 14-15.

84

Id. at 15-16.

The scope of the problem is revealed by the fact that in 1920, 50% of the personnel of
the Income Tax Unit, which had primary responsibility for income and excess profits
tax matters, either resigned or were discharged. Roughly, then, the average tenure at
that time was approximately one year and, when the training period is taken into
account, the time actually spent on Bureau work by the average employee was six to
eight months.
Id. at 16.
85

Id. at 20-21. A taxpayer who disputed an assessed liability had two choices: (1) pay the
tax and then file for a refund with the Commissioner of the Bureau, and if the Commissioner
rejected the refund request, file suit in either the federal district court or the court of claims, or
(2) not pay the tax and file with the Bureau a claim of abatement, which required the taxpayer
to post a bond for the disputed tax and which procedure was subject to a number of
exceptions. Id. at 21-23, 28-35.
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permanent federal income tax in 1913, when the federal government had relied
primarily on license fees, customs duties, and excise taxes for revenue, the “pay first,
argue later” system was not considered to be overly onerous on taxpayers. However,
the WWI Revenue Acts imposed very high rates on high income taxpayers so that
the “pay first” rule became harsh and further fueled the need for an impartial tribunal
to provide taxpayers with some opportunity to dispute a tax before assessment and
collection.86
The federal government needed to find a way to alleviate taxpayer dissatisfaction
with the new tax so that taxpayers would continue to comply voluntarily with the
system and pay. Over the next few decades, the federal government endeavored to
find a mechanism or system to enable taxpayers to dispute a tax, but, at the same
time, not enable taxpayers to hold the government hostage by refusing or delaying
the payment of the tax. As discussed below, the government initially created an
entity within the Bureau itself to hear disputes, then shifted to an agency independent
of the Treasury Department or the Bureau, and then, finally, created an Article I
court, which sat in a courthouse separate from the Treasury Department. The dispute
mechanism or system evolved in this way in order to provide taxpayers with
assurance that the dispute mechanism was not a sham or biased in favor of the
government. Congress steadily increased the autonomy of the dispute mechanism to
bolster public trust in the tax system.
The Commissioner created a subdivision within the Bureau in late 1919 or early
1920: the Committee on Appeals and Review (Committee);87 it was separate from
the Income Tax Unit (which was responsible for administering the income and
excess profit taxes), although the Committee was staffed by five former members of
the Unit.88 Initially, the Committee’s purpose was twofold: (1) to hear taxpayer
appeals, and (2) to advise the Commissioner regarding the preparation of Treasury
decisions, regulations, and rulings, with most of the Committee’s time being spent
on the latter.89
However, in 1921, Congress amended the tax code by enacting the Revenue Act
of 1921, which required the Commissioner to give a taxpayer notice of an

Filing suit for a refund was not a straightforward matter at the time. Prior to 1921,
refund suits could be brought against the United States under the Tucker Act, which had been
enacted in 1886. If the claim exceeded $10,000, however, the taxpayer had to proceed against
the collector personally. Unfortunately for the taxpayer, if the collector were dead or no
longer in office, the taxpayer could not sue in district court but had to go to the, then, Court of
Claims. The Tucker Act eventually was amended so that taxpayers could sue in the district
court for refunds in excess of $10,000 even if the collector had died or was out of office. See
Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 152 (1960); Camp, supra note 12, at 21 n.86.
86

CHARLES D. HAMEL & EDWARD H. MCDERMOTT, HAMEL’S MANUAL OF BOARD OF TAX
APPEALS PRACTICE 4-5 (Prentice-Hall 1929).
87

1920 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 14-15.

88

DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 39. The Committee’s size increased to ten in 1922 and then
to twenty in 1923. Id. at 41 nn.232-33. See 1920 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 15; 1921
COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 14; 1922 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 15; 1923 COMM’R. OF INT. REV.
REP. 9.
89

DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 39, 41.
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assessment and an opportunity to file an administrative appeal,90 and the Committee
was given the task of hearing these section 250(d) appeals, which occupied most of
the Committee’s time. As noted by the Commissioner at the time, “[t]he duties of
the Committee became ‘more closely confined to . . . [those] of a purely appellate
body.’”91 Although individual Committee members would hear an appeal, the
Committee would meet to approve each recommendation of each member. After the
Committee increased in size and was divided into subcommittees, each
subcommittee would meet to approve each member’s recommendation, and then the
subcommittee’s recommendation would be forwarded to the Chairman of the
Committee for his review and approval. This process was designed to ensure
consistency in decision-making among the Committee members.92 Beginning in
1923, the Committee began to dispatch subcommittees to cities other than
Washington, D.C., to hear cases.93
This collegiality with regard to the decision process, review by the chairman of
the Committee, and circuit riding were practices that carried over to the Board of
Tax Appeals and then later to the Article I United States Tax Court. However, the
Committee differed in some important ways from its successors. The Committee
was not a fact finder during appeal hearings and did not operate as a trial court, but
rather functioned in an appellate capacity.94 Taxpayers submitted evidence in
written form95 and could request an oral hearing and submit written briefs.96 The
hearings were informal and non-adversarial, and “Committee proceedings frequently
became negotiating sessions; in these cases Committee recommendations were no
more than settlements of disputed issues rather than judicial determinations of legal
questions.”97
However, almost from the Committee’s inception, it was faced with calls for its
replacement by an independent Board of Tax Appeals, which would operate with
more formal procedures.98 The Committee’s status as an entity within the Bureau

90

Rev. Act, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 265 (1921).

91

1923 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 8, in DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 41 n.236.

92

DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 40.

93

Id. at 42.

94

1923 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 8 (“In its later years, the Commissioner referred to the
Committee as a ‘quasi-judicial body of appellate jurisdiction.’”). See DUBROFF, supra note
70, at 42.
95

The Committee could, in its discretion, accept new evidence. See A.R.M. 219, III-1 C.
B. 319, 319-20 (1924).
96

Id.; O.D. 709, 3 C. B. 370 (1920).

97

DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 43.

98

The American Mining Congress and the United States Chamber of Commerce proposed
creation of a Board of Tax Appeals. The most influential advocate for an independent Board
of Tax Appeals was the Tax Simplification Board, created by the Revenue Act of 1921, ch.
136, § 1327, 42 Stat. 317, whose purpose was to investigate the administration of the internal
revenue laws. DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 51. In addition, on November 10, 1923, the
Secretary of the Treasury issued his annual report in which he recommended the creation of a
board of tax appeals to be located within the Treasury Department, although either party
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undermined the public’s confidence in its independence in two, somewhat
contradictory ways. First, the public was concerned that the Committee was inclined
to find in the Bureau’s favor because if the Bureau prevailed in the appeal, the
taxpayer would be forced to pay the tax and then sue for a refund; however, if the
taxpayer prevailed in the appeal, that was the end of the matter because the
Committee was part of the Bureau and, therefore, the Committee’s decision
represented the final decision of the Bureau (at least after 1923). This created the
impression, if not the reality, that the Committee was biased, in favor of the Bureau,
to generate revenue.99 Second, the newspapers had publicized several cases in which
the Committee ruled in favor of taxpayers who received very large refunds. Because
of the informal, nonpublic nature of Committee hearings, the public feared that some
taxpayers were receiving special treatment.100
B. The Board of Tax Appeals: Independent Administrative Agency
Taxpayers still had the right to pay a tax and sue for a refund in either the, then,
Claims Court or the district courts, both of which were completely independent of
the executive branch and, therefore, taxpayers could be confident of their
impartiality. However, Congress did not want to create a new Article III court to
hear pre-payment disputes, yet still needed to reassure taxpayers that the system was
fair. One way to do so was to remove the decision-making function from the same
agency that investigated and prosecuted delinquent taxpayers. As a result, Congress
passed the Revenue Act of 1924,101 which created the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA),
an agency located within the executive branch and independent of both the Bureau
and the Department of the Treasury.102 The Revenue Act of 1924 empowered the
BTA to conduct pre-assessment review of income, estate and gift, and excess profits
taxes.103 Unlike the prior Committee that it was replacing, the BTA was to operate

dissatisfied with the result could then sue in federal court. See HAMEL & MCDERMOTT, supra
note 86, at 5.
99

DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 41-42.

100
Sully, Those Refunded Millions, SATURDAY EVENING POST, June 21, 1924, at 36, cited
in DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 45 n.260.
101

Rev. Act, ch. 234, § 1100(a), 43 Stat. 352 (1924).

102

Rev. Act, ch. 234, § 900(a), (k), 43 Stat. 336, 338 (1924). For an overview of the
various House and Senate proposals and committee reports detailing how Congress progressed
from creating the BTA as an agency under the control of the Treasury Department to that of
an independent, stand-alone agency free to create its own rules and procedures, see Appeal of
S. Cal. Loan Ass’n, 4 B.T.A. 223, 229-34 (1926); Old Colony Trust v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716,
721-22 (1929).
103

Rev. Act, ch. 234, § 324, 43 Stat. 316 (1924). The BTA also was authorized to hear
taxpayer appeals from jeopardy assessments if the taxpayer filed a claim in abatement. Id. §§
279, 312, 43 Stat. 300, 310 (1924). As noted, in 1924 a number of excise taxes existed, such
as on cameras, corporate stock, mah-jongg sets, and narcotics, but because these excise taxes
did not raise a significant amount of revenue, the BTA was not given authority to provide preassessment review for them. DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 73; see infra note 138. See also
Flora, 362 U.S. at 158.
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in a more structured manner and was to publish its decisions; however, the BTA
created its own procedures and rules of evidence.104
Because the BTA was an independent agency, it no longer could privately review
the Bureau’s or Treasury Department’s files, but rather would need to render a
decision based on the information the taxpayer and the Bureau presented to the
BTA.105 However, the BTA’s findings, conclusions, and decisions were merely
prima facie evidence in the event of a future trial. Neither party had the right to
challenge directly the BTA’s decisions by filing an appeal in the circuit courts.
Rather, the BTA’s decisions were merely considered to be prima facie evidence if
either party filed a subsequent action in the district courts, which action would be
heard de novo.106 Therefore, if the taxpayer prevailed before the BTA, the Bureau
could not summarily assess the tax, but had to commence a new action in federal
court for a readjudication of whether a deficiency existed. If the Bureau prevailed
before the BTA, the Bureau could immediately assess and collect the tax; however,
the taxpayer could sue in court for a refund.107 As a result, as noted by the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, the hearings before the BTA were “little more than a
preliminary skirmish, a run for luck.”108
104

Rev. Act, ch. 234, § 900(g), (h), 43 Stat. 337, 338 (1924).

Hearings before the Board and its divisions shall be open to the public. The
proceedings of the Board and its divisions shall be conducted in accordance with such
rules of evidence and procedure as the Board may prescribe. It shall be the duty of the
Board and of each division to make a report in writing of its findings of fact and
decision in each case, and a copy of its report shall be entered of record and a copy
furnished the taxpayer. If the amount of tax in controversy is more than $10,000 the
oral testimony taken at the hearing shall be reduced to writing and the report shall
contain an opinion in writing in addition to the findings of fact and decision. All
reports of the Board and its divisions and all evidence received by the Board and its
divisions . . . shall be public records open to the inspection of the public. The Board
shall provide for the publication of its reports at the Government Printing Office . . . .
Id. at 337-38.
105

Appeal of Lyon, 1 B.T.A. 378, 379 (1925) (“[E]vidence that has been introduced before
any other department of the Government must be reintroduced before this Board before we
can consider it.”).
106

Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 721-22. See also Appeal of Union Metal Mfg. Co., 4
B.T.A. 287, 289 (1926).
The remedy of trial before the Board before payment was supplemental to the
taxpayer’s established remedy by suit in court after payment. This added remedy the
taxpayer could avail himself of at his pleasure and to the extent he might desire and
still retain his preexisting remedy in court. When he sued in court the Board’s
decision had not the force of a judgment, binding unless reversed, but by section
900(g), ‘the findings of the Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.’ It was clearly contemplated that, so far as all the courts were concerned, the
Board’s decision and findings of fact should not be res adjudicata but should merely
be prima facie evidence.
Id.
107

See DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 116.

108

Blair v. Curran, 24 F.2d 390, 392 (1st Cir. 1928).
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This system proved to be inefficient because each case heard by the BTA could
be retried by the district court, and then subject to appeal in the courts of appeals,
and then appeal to the United States Supreme Court (assuming the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari). Therefore, in the Revenue Act of 1926, Congress
provided for direct judicial review of the BTA’s decisions by either party filing “a
petition for review in a Circuit Court of Appeals or the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia under rules adopted by such courts.”109 If either party appealed,
the matter would be heard as an appellate matter in the court of appeals (including
possibly in the court of appeals for the District of Columbia) and would no longer be
retried de novo in the district courts.110 As a result, the BTA needed to operate in a
more formal fashion in order to create an appropriate record for appellate review.111
The Revenue Act of 1926 provided that the BTA’s rules of evidence had to be in
accordance with the rules of equity applicable in the District of Columbia.112
109
Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 722. Either the taxpayer or the Commissioner had to file
the petition within six months or the BTA’s decision would be final. Only by filing an appeal
within six months could the taxpayer delay the assessment or the collection of the tax. Id. at
725-26. See also Rev. Act, ch. 27, §§ 1001, 1005, 44 Stat. 109, 110 (1926).

In 1948, Congress enacted legislation to clarify that decisions of the then denominated “Tax
Court of the United States” (still an independent agency in the executive branch but with a
judicial title) be reviewed on appeal under the same standards applicable to decisions of the
district courts sitting without juries. Rev. Act, ch. 646, § 36, 62 Stat. 991 (1948).
110

Rev. Act, ch. 27, § 1003(b), 44 Stat. 110 (1926) (providing that the courts of appeals
and the United States Supreme Court “shall have power to affirm or, if the decision of the
Board is not in accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the decision of the Board, with or
without remanding the case for a rehearing, as justice may require”). See also Old Colony
Trust, 279 U.S. at 722.
111

See Curran, 24 F.2d at 392.

[The BTA] was created by the Act of 1924 to decide tax appeals. . . . It was
authorized to establish its own rules of evidence and procedure. . . . Consequently it
was not restricted by legal rules of evidence, but could receive such evidence as
seemed to it worthy of credit, though not measuring up to the legal standard. No
appeal from or right of review of the Board’s decision was provided. The parties,
therefore, did not contemplate an appeal, and there was no occasion for their saving
their rights by way of exceptions to evidence and requests for findings and rulings, to
be preserved in a record on appeal.
Id.
112

Rev. Act § 907(a) (1926), cited in Curran, 24 F.2d at 392.

The Revenue Act of 1926 radically changed the situation from what it had previously
been. By it the Circuit Courts of Appeals were given exclusive jurisdiction to review
the decision of the Board. . . . In furtherance of this the Circuit Courts of Appeals
were authorized to adopt rules for the preparation of the record for review . . . the
hearings before the Board were to be stenographically reported; and defined rules of
evidence were prescribed. . . . It took away the right of a party aggrieved by a
decision of the Board to bring a court action and have a trial de novo on issues of fact
and law . . . and limited his right to a review of the Board’s decision in the Circuit
Courts of Appeals on questions of law only.
Id.
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As the Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative
Procedure113 later noted, oftentimes it is unduly burdensome for agencies to comply
with the rules of evidence for jury trials; however, agencies generally do observe
some standard with regard to the proffering and acceptance of evidence, and the
Acheson Report found nothing out of the ordinary with regard to the BTA’s standard
of the rules of equity applicable to the District of Columbia. Certainly, this evidence
standard does not signify that the BTA was a court and not an agency.
The absence of a jury and the technical subject-matter with which
agencies often deal, all weigh heavily against a requirement that
administrative agencies observe what is know as the “common law rules”
of evidence for jury trials. Such a requirement would be inconsistent with
the objectives of dispatch, elasticity, and simplicity which the
administrative process is designed to promote.
....
As a result, it is rarely suggested that the older common law rules of
evidence for jury trials should be imposed upon administrative agencies.
Congressional sanction has been given to varying degrees of relaxation.
The Federal Power Commission and the National Labor Relations Board
are expressly freed from application of “the rules of evidence.” The
Board of Tax Appeals must observe only the rules of evidence applicable
in the courts of the District of Columbia in equity proceedings. Even
where the statute is silent, some agencies have prescribed adherence to
reasonable requirements.114
The federal courts, and the BTA itself, repeatedly acknowledged that it was an
agency, albeit an “anomalous” one with strictly judicial duties.115 For example, in
113

See discussion infra Part III, C.

114

FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE
PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8 at 70 (1941).

ON

ADMINISTRATIVE

115
Old Colony Trust, 279 U.S. at 725 (“The Board of Tax Appeals is not a court.”); see
also Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926) noting that the BTA
was an independent agency in the executive branch of the government, albeit one with “quasijudicial duties”. The Supreme Court went on to note that it would be odd for the BTA not to
be authorized to prescribe rules of practice for the admission of attorneys permitted to practice
before it “when in the Treasury Department and the office of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue there is a list of attorneys enrolled for practice in the very cases which are to be
appealed to the Board.” Id. The Supreme Court compared the Board’s authority in this area
to two agencies and not to the federal courts; Shults Bread Co. v. Comm’r , 10 B.T.A. 268,
270-71 (1928). The Board held that it was not bound by the interpretations the federal courts
have placed on rules of practice and procedure and the permitted relaxation thereof.

Both of the parties have failed to point out whether the same lines of reasoning
applied to the construction of rules of court are applicable in construing the rules of
this Board. If the same reasoning applies it must be on the postulate that the Board is
a court. The Board in many respects occupies a unique position in the governmental
scheme. It is clearly denominated by Congress as ‘an independent agency in the
executive branch of the Government.’ Its functions, however, are at least quasijudicial . . . and it has ‘appellate powers which are judicial in character’ . . . . Its
proceedings are required by statute to be conducted ‘in accordance with the rules of
evidence applicable in courts of equity in the District of Columbia.’ From it, despite
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1927, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in Chicago Railway
Equipment Co. v. Blair116 in which the Court held that the BTA had failed to carry
out its duties as an agency, and conduct its own investigation, when neither the
Commissioner nor the taxpayer had introduced evidence on a critical issue. In
Chicago Railway Equipment Co., the taxpayer and the Commissioner disagreed as to
the fair market value of certain depreciable property as of March 1, 1913 (when the
federal income tax was first imposed).117 The federal tax code at that time provided
that depreciation was to be calculated based on the property’s fair market value as of
that date, and if the fair market value could not be determined, then by the property’s
cost less any depreciation that had been taken as of that date.118 The Commissioner
calculated the depreciation based on cost and stated that there was no evidence
available as to the property’s fair market value.
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to the BTA because
“the board disregarded competent and material evidence bearing upon the market
value as of that date.”119 The Court reviewed the chronology of the taxpayer’s
business, including its acquisition of the various pieces of depreciable property,
which would indicate the fair market value and noted that it was “not possible that in
their investigation [the revenue agents] remained ignorant of so many of the facts
above herein recited.”120 The Court then went on to hold that the BTA had erred in
failing to consider this evidence.
Congress disagreed with the Seventh Circuit that the BTA had a duty to conduct
its own independent investigation. The House version of the Revenue Bill of 1928
contained a provision stating that “no decision of the board . . . should hereafter be
modified or reversed because the board . . . has failed to consider evidence not
adduced [at the hearing].”121 The Senate agreed with the House in principle but
thought it unnecessary to include the provision in the final bill because the
legislative history made it clear to the courts Congress’s view that the BTA was an
executive agency but that it only performed a judicial-type function.122
its being an executive body, appeals may be taken directly to the Federal courts.
These considerations serve to show the anomalous character of the Board and in our
opinion decisions of the judiciary as to their rules can not be taken bodily and set
down as conclusive upon us.
Id. But see S. Cal. Loan, 4 B.T.A. at 234, in which the BTA responded with asperity, if not
outright indignation, to the petitioner’s contention that “this Board is purely an administrative
branch of the executive branch of the executive department and does not partake, nor have the
aspects of, a judicial tribunal,” id. at 229. After an extensive review of its legislative history,
the BTA held meritless petitioner’s contention that the rules applicable to court procedure had
no application to the BTA. Id. at 234.
116

Chicago Ry. Equip. Co. v. Blair, 20 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1927).

117

Id. at 11.

118

Id. at 13.

119

Id.

120

Id. at 14.

121

H.R. REP. NO. 70-2, at 30-31 (1927); H.R. REP. NO. 70-1882, at 21-22 (1928).

122

S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 38 (1928). See also DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 167.
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C. Final Report of Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure
Administrative agencies began to proliferate at the beginning of the twentieth
century and, in particular, during the Roosevelt administration.123 However, these
agencies oftentimes operated with great independence, and there was no coherent or
consistent governing principles as to how the agencies operated or the standards the
courts should employ when conducting judicial review.124 In late 1938, Attorney
General Homer Cummings sent a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt urging him
to request that Congress authorize the Attorney General to form a committee to
investigate the procedures by which administrative agencies operate and the
standards the courts should employ when conducting judicial review.125
123

George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1561-62 (1996).
The Great Depression accelerated a trend that had begun in the late nineteenth
century toward greater control of the economy by federal commissions and agencies.
Even before 1929, the federal government had already reached far into the nation’s
economic life. Before 1900, approximately one-third of present federal agencies
already existed. . . . In the first three decades of the twentieth century . . . the number
of agencies doubled. . . .
Growth in the number of agencies quickened under Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
administration. Upon taking office in 1933, Roosevelt and the Democratic Congress
moved quickly to save the country from the economic and social devastation that the
Depression had caused. An avalanche of new federal agencies and commissions . . .
reached ever more broadly into a free market that appeared to have failed.
Id.
124
S. DOC. NO. 79-248 (1946) (comments of Rep. Doliver), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 379-80 (1946).

Mr. Chairman, during the period of time since the close of the First World War,
there has been a tremendous expansion of the number of agencies, administrative
bodies, and commissions of the United States Government. . . .
It necessarily followed, I suppose, since so many of them were created, that each of
them would develop its own variety of procedure—that each of them would have its
own method of doing business. Accordingly the problem that confronted the citizen
who overstepped the bounds of the rules of some agency was to discover how to
alleviate the situation. It was more complex because there were no uniform rules of
procedure, and a person had to delve into the intricacies of each agency or each
commission in order to find out what to do.
This bill is certainly a step in the right direction. It attempts to give some
uniformity of procedure. It attempts to direct these agencies and commissions and
departments to use forms that can be understood which shall be uniform through all of
them.
Not only does it promote uniformity but it codifies the procedures in a court review.
Id. (describing agency operations and judicial review that the APA was designed to harmonize
and make more uniform).
125

FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 252 (1941) (letter from Homer Cummings). Concerns about
the increasing power of administrative agencies had been brewing for some time. As more
agencies came into existence and increasingly affected every day life, congressional and
public alarm grew that this unregulated and unelected part of government could impinge on
due process rights if left unchecked. At the same time, Congress and the public recognized
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I venture to bring to your attention, and to renew the suggestion which I
have made publicly at different times, that there is a need for procedural
reform in the wide and growing field of administrative law. Experience
has proved the importance and necessity for the increasing use of the
administrative process in the aid of executive, legislative, and judicial
function. Government cannot perform its many and varied tasks without
this efficient and flexible instrumentality. Its usefulness and increasing
assistance to the functions of government necessarily depend, however,
upon a procedure which affords quick and well informed action, grounded
upon the fundamentals of fair play.
....
The problem is one which calls for a most thorough survey of existing
practices and procedure and a careful consideration by a trained body,
constituted of individuals who can detect present deficiencies and point
the way to improvements in the use of this process . . . . Of course, it goes
without saying that in such procedure there should be proper safeguards
for the protection of substantive rights and adequate, but not extravagant,
judicial review.126
President Roosevelt responded on February 16, 1939 by directing the Attorney
General to investigate the issue, noting that “[i]t seems appropriate that the reform of
administrative procedure should . . . be sponsored by the Department of Justice.”127
On February 23, 1939, Attorney General Frank Murphy issued Order No. 3215 in
which he created the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure
and appointed its members.128 On January 24, 1941, Attorney General Robert H.
that exigencies of modern life necessitated resort to administrative agencies. Throughout the
1930s in particular, the government and the American Bar Association called for review of
administrative agency power.
The debate may be said to have got beyond the point of mere skirmishing when the
American Bar Association in the spring of 1933 appointed a Special Committee on
Administrative Law and to have resulted in a somewhat inconclusive victory for the
viewers-with-alarm upon passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.
Significant among the events of the intervening years of contest were this Special
Committee’s original advocacy of an independent administrative court; the
abandonment of that effort in 1937 and the decision of the American Bar Association
to press instead for legislation to assure the fundamentals of due process; the report in
that same year of the President’s Committee on Administrative Management, with its
startling recommendation that the independent agencies be absorbed into the executive
departments; and, by way of climax, the passage of the Walter-Logan Act followed by
President Roosevelt’s strongly, if not intemperately, worded veto of that legislation on
December 18, 1940.
Id. at vi (Editor’s Preface).
126

Id. at 252 (letter from Homer Cummings).

127

Id. (letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt).

128

Id. (Order No. 3215). On March 15, 1939, Attorney General Murphy issued
Supplement No. 1 to Order No. 3215 in which he appointed additional members to the
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure. Id. at 253. See Report of the
Special Committee on Administrative Law, 66 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 439 (1941).
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Jackson transmitted the Acheson Committee’s final report with its recommendations
to President Roosevelt.129
The Acheson Committee conducted in-depth
investigations of twenty-seven agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and the Board of Tax Appeals.130 The Final Report was organized as follows:
Chapter I.

The Origins, Development, and Characteristics of the
Administrative Process;
Chapter II.
Administrative Information;
Chapter III. Informal Methods of Adjudication;
Chapter IV. Formal Adjudication: Problems of Organization;
Chapter V.
Formal Adjudication: Problems of Procedure;
Chapter VI. Judicial Review of Administrative Adjudication;
Chapter VII. Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making.
Although the APA, enacted several years later, did not adopt a number of the
Acheson Committee’s recommendations, it did adopt many of them and one can
discern the skeletal structure of the APA in the Final Report’s organization. It is
significant that nowhere in the Final Report does the Acheson Committee even hint
that it viewed the BTA as anything other than an administrative agency nor does the
Final Report recommend that the BTA’s status be altered in any way or that it should
be exempt from the Final Report’s recommendations.
The Final Report
acknowledges that the BTA operates in a “judicial” fashion—as do other agencies—
and finds nothing remarkable or unique in the BTA’s function.
A substantial number of existing administrative agencies represent an
effort to discharge in a fashion analogous to the judicial a function which
might have been discharged executively or even legislatively. Many of
these, as we have noted in the proceeding paragraph, are concerned with
disbursing what, in legal theory, have been regarded as benefits. The
Patent Office, so far as concerns the issuance of patents, is an early
illustration. So also came to be the General Land Office. The United
States Employees’ Compensation Commission—so far as concerns
payment of benefits to Federal employees—is an administrative agency
doing what Congress formerly did by private acts. . . . Most recently, in
the field of general social security, Congress in creating the Social
Security Board and the Railroad Retirement Board directed action by
adjudication as a matter of course; indeed, establishment of these agencies
would scarcely have been possible, politically, on any other terms.
Extension of the rule of law through resort to the administrative
process is by no means confined to the disbursing of benefits. In the
assessment of taxes, for example, the development of an administrative
procedure through the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Board of Tax
Although James W. Morris was appointed as Chairman, at the time of the Committee’s
final report, Dean Acheson was the Chairman and the Committee is oftentimes referred to as
the Acheson Committee, and the author will follow suit here.
129

FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at iii (1941) (letter from Robert H. Jackson).
130

Id. at 3-5.
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Appeals has operated in considerable measure to replace an executive
procedure.131
The Final Report directed its attention towards reformation of agency formal
adjudication processes. The Acheson Committee noted that there was considerable
diversity as to how the various agencies conducted formal adjudication and the
weight attached to the decisions of the agency officials who conducted the hearings.
Again, the Acheson Committee did not find anything extraordinary in how the BTA
conducted its hearings or the weight accorded the decisions of its members.
The methods of hearing and initial decision and the internal
procedural structure vary from agency to agency. In general, it has been
customary to designate hearing officers before whom evidence may be
adduced—whether they be a board of three or more individuals, or, as is
more common, a single hearing officer . . . . These hearing officers have
been selected in various ways. Cases coming before the Board of Tax
Appeals—which has no other duties than to hear and decide cases—and
the National Mediation Board are heard by single members of the agency
itself; cases coming before the National Railroad Adjustment Board are
heard by the full bi-partisan membership of one of the four divisions into
which the Board is divided by statute. . . .
No less varied is the weight attached by the several agencies to the
judgments of those who conduct the hearings. In most of the agencies the
person who presides is an adviser with no real power to decide. In a few
agencies the hearing officer’s or board’s decision is conclusive unless
appealed by the parties to the head of the agency or unless the agency
head itself takes the case up for consideration after initial decision. 132
The Final Report then went on to note that the Board of Tax Appeals followed the
latter course with regard to weight.133
The Acheson Committee made a number of recommendations for improving
formal agency adjudication to ensure that initial hearings were conducted by an
official who possessed the power to render a decision and to expedite review of that
initial decision by agency heads.134 However, the Acheson Committee found that the
procedures by the BTA—and some other agencies—did not need to be changed
because the procedures in place were effective. The Acheson Committee’s
statement that its recommendations need not be adopted by the BTA was based on
the fact that the BTA was operating effectively, and not based on some perception
that the BTA was somehow exempt from recommended agency procedure or was
not actually an agency.

131

Id. at 12.

132

Id. at 44.

133

Id. at 44 n.1 (“This is the formula adopted by the Railroad Retirement Board, the
Veterans’ Administration, the administration of the grazing statutes by the Department of the
Interior, the Social Security Board, the Board of Tax Appeals, and cases handled by the
Bureau of Motor Carriers of the Interstate Commerce Commission.”).
134

Id. at 45-55.
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The purpose of the recommendation is, insofar as possible, to fix the
responsibility for initial determinations in able, highly placed officials
who have themselves heard the evidence, and to make their
determinations a significant part of the process of administrative decision.
Obviously, then, the recommendations do not apply in agencies where the
heads themselves hear and decide cases. Agencies like the United States
Tariff Commission and the National Railroad Adjustment Board are
therefore altogether excluded, while other agencies which occasionally sit
en banc are in no wise intended to be precluded from continuing to do so.
Nor is anything in the Committee’s recommendations intended to affect
the hearing of cases by one or more, but less than a majority, of the
members of an agency. The procedures of the Board of Tax Appeals, for
example, need not be altered.135
The Acheson Committee also recommended that agencies employ prehearings in
order to expedite and simplify formal adjudication and noted that the BTA, along
with several other agencies such as the Social Security Board and the Civil
Aeronautics Board, already did so to their advantage. Again, the Acheson
Committee did not find this arguably “judicial” function to be a uniquely
distinguishing feature of the BTA.136
Finally, the Acheson Committee addressed the issue of what rules of evidence
should control formal agency adjudication in light of the fact that agencies do not
use juries and frequently deal with technical issues. The Final Report recommended
that Congress permit agencies to employ a more relaxed rule with regard to the
introduction of evidence, noting that the BTA, like other agencies, did not use the
same rules of evidence as the courts.
[I]t is rarely suggested that the older common law rules of evidence for
jury trials should be imposed upon administrative agencies.
Congressional sanction has been given to varying degrees of relaxation.
The Federal Power Commission and the National Labor Relations Board
are expressly freed from application of “the rules of evidence.” The
Board of Tax Appeals must observe only the rules of evidence applicable
in the courts of the District of Columbia in equity proceedings.137
The Acheson Committee conducted one of the most thorough and well-respected
reviews of agency procedure.138 Unfortunately, its recommendations were held in
abeyance, because of the start of World War II, so that the matter of administrative
agency reform and enactment of the APA did not occur until 1946.139 It is
135

Id. at 53-54.

136

Id. at 65-66.

137

Id. at 70.

138

See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, Birth Pangs of the Administrative Procedure Act, 10 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U. 51 (1996). “Justice Felix Frankfurter applauded the Final Report . . . as having
given ‘for the first time . . . a comprehensive and luminous insight into the practices and
procedures of federal administrative agencies and their relation to the judiciary.’” Id. See
also Editorials, 27 A.B.A. J. 95 (1941) (describing the report as “monumental in character and
momentous in . . . significance and usefulness”).
139

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, supra note 124, at 248.
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significant that the Acheson Committee never believed nor recommended that the
BTA, which had been in existence for more than fifteen years, should be treated as a
court or somehow in a different manner than other administrative agencies.
D. Tax Court of the United States: Independent Administrative Agency
In 1942, while Congress was considering enactment of the Revenue Act of
1942,140 the Chairman of the BTA, John Edgar Murdoch, urged Congress to change
the name of the BTA to the Tax Court of the United States.141 Chairman Murdoch
supported his request by noting that, although the BTA operated as a judicial body
with formal procedures, the name designation of “Board of Tax Appeals” confused
the public who expected the BTA to operate as an agency with informal procedures.
Further, when riding circuit, BTA members experienced difficulty in arranging for
suitable hearing rooms in courthouses because court clerks balked at providing space
to an agency.
Chairman Murdock contended that difficulties the Board was
experiencing in obtaining the use of hearing rooms in many of the fifty
cities in which it held trials could be reduced by simply naming the Board
a court. The nature of Board proceedings was judicial and courtrooms
were the most appropriate sites for trials. But many providers of court
space throughout the country were, according to Chairman Murdock,
reluctant to permit administrative hearings to be carried on in their
facilities since such hearings were generally informal ones “to which
large and undesirable crowds [were] attracted” and at which “smoking”
was permitted.142
Then Attorney General Francis Biddle strongly opposed the proposal. He expressed
his views in his letters to Senator Doughton, Chair of the Senate Finance
In August 1941 the increasingly threatening international situation moved the Senate
Judiciary Committee to postpone further consideration of the legislative proposals.
The attack at Pearl Harbor occurred before the year was out. During the war years
1942-43 the subject was necessarily in abeyance; but war legislation, administration,
and congressional investigations brought administrative processes more and more into
prominence. In June 1944 new bills were introduced by the chairmen of the Senate
and House Judiciary Committees . . . and thereafter there was a good deal of
discussion and activity in and out of the Government with respect to the form such
legislation should take. The Attorney General, utilizing some of the staff of his
former Committee on Administrative Procedure, had a voluminous analysis made of
the new bill.
Id. See also id. at 296, 380.
140

Rev. Act, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 957 (1942).

141

Actually, Chairman Murdoch asked that the BTA’s name be changed to the United
States Tax Court, and much of the correspondence and proposed legislation used that
nomenclature; however, Commerce Clearing House, which reported tax cases in a reporting
service entitled “United States Tax Cases,” was concerned that confusion would result if the
court and the cases shared the same initials. DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 184. Therefore, the
final version of the Revenue Act of 1942 changed the BTA’s name to the Tax Court of the
United States. Id.
142

DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 178.
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Committee,143 and to Representative George, Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee,144 stating that he did not agree that the BTA was a court “in
everything but name” and pointed to several Supreme Court decisions in support of
his position. For example, in Old Colony Trust v. Commissioner145 the Supreme
Court had flatly stated that “[t]he Board of Tax Appeals is not a court. It is an
executive or administrative board, upon the decision of which the parties are given
an opportunity to base a petition for review to the courts after the administrative
inquiry of the Board has been had and decided.”146 In addition, in United States ex
rel. Girard Co. v. Helvering,147 the Supreme Court had noted that the BTA did not
have the authority to enforce its decisions—an inherent judicial power—but rather,
had to turn to the district courts for enforcement.148
Attorney General Biddle was concerned that the name change was a first step
towards converting the BTA to an Article III court (which he considered
unnecessary because the BTA was functioning well as an administrative agency) and
that even if after the name change the Tax Court of the United States continued to
function as an agency, the public would be confused or misled into believing that
they were dealing with a court.149
Despite Attorney General Biddle’s opposition, the Revenue Act of 1942 changed
the name of the Board of Tax Appeals to the Tax Court of the United States; its
members were given the title of judges and the chairman was given the title of Chief
Judge.150 However, the Tax Court of the United States continued its status as an
independent agency located in the executive branch.
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court decided Dobson v. Commissioner151 in
which the Court made it clear that the BTA and the Tax Court of the United States
143
Id. at 180. Francis Biddle had been a member of the Acheson Committee, prior to his
tenure as Attorney General.
144

Id. at 178.

145

Old Colony Trust v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).

146
Id. at 725. It should be noted that Justice McReynolds thought that the Court violated
separation of powers principles by hearing the case. Justice McReynolds argued that the
judicial branch was intruding on the authority of the executive branch because the Court was
deciding a dispute between two executive branch agencies: the BTA and the BIR.

The Board of Tax Appeals belongs to the executive department of the Government
and performs administrative functions—the assessment of taxes. The statute attempts
to grant a broad appeal to the courts and directs them to reconsider the Board’s
action—to do or to say what it should have done. This enjoins the use of executive
power, not judicial.
Id. at 731.
147

United States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540 (1937).

148

Id. at 542.

149

DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 180-81.

150

Rev. Act, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 798, 957 (1942). “The Board shall be known as the
Tax Court of the United States.” Id.
151

Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
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were administrative agencies152 whose findings of fact on appeal were entitled to the
greater level of deference accorded findings of fact by agencies.153 In Dobson, the
taxpayers sold stock that had lost its value and properly deducted the losses in the
two years of sale. Subsequently, the taxpayers successfully brought suit against the
entity that had sold them the stock; however, by the time the taxpayers received the
settlement, the statute of limitations had expired for the years in which the taxpayers
had deducted the losses.154 The Commissioner’s position was that the settlement was
ordinary income in the year received.155 However, the settlement did not entirely
152

The taxpayers had their deficiencies reviewed by the BTA; however, while the case was
wending its way through the judicial system, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1942,
which changed the name of the BTA to the Tax Court of the United States. In its opinion, the
United States Supreme Court made no distinction between the two entities with regard to the
matter under consideration. See id.
153

Unless Congress has specified that an appellate court should apply a different standard
for review of a district court’s finding of fact, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6)
provides that findings of facts made by district courts in civil cases “must not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous.” A finding of fact is clearly erroneous “when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 395 (1948). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
123 (1969). In other words, if the district court’s finding is plausible in light of the record
viewed in its entirety, the appellate court may not reverse the finding even if the court is
convinced that it would have weighed the evidence differently.
In contrast, findings of fact by agencies are given more deference by the reviewing court.
Congress had not yet enacted the APA at the time of the Dobson decision. However, the
standards for review set out in section 706 of the APA were based on principles already in
existence. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 93
(1947). Unless Congress has specified that the reviewing court should apply a different
standard, section
706(2)(E) of the APA provides that for agency adjudication that was conducted in accordance
with formal procedures (which is usually not the situation), the reviewing court shall set aside
agency findings that are unsupported by substantial evidence. The term “substantial
evidence” is a bit misleading. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a finding after reviewing the entire record. See
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
Section 706(2)(A) of the APA provides that for informal agency adjudication (which is the
norm and how the IRS conducts collection due process hearings), the reviewing court shall set
aside agency findings that are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. An agency does
not abuse its discretion when making a finding of fact if there is a rational basis for the
finding. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1977). Therefore, it is more difficult for a reviewing court to reverse informal agency
findings of fact than to reverse a district court’s findings.
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-16 (1971), the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that if Congress fails to specify which section 706 APA standard
to apply to review of agency action, the reviewing court should apply section 706(2)(A)—the
abuse of discretion standard.
154

Dobson, 320 U.S. at 491.

155

Id.
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compensate the taxpayers for the stock’s loss in value, and if the portion of the
settlement allocable to the prior two years of loss had been added to what the
taxpayers had received from the stock’s sale at the time, the taxpayers still would
have suffered a loss.156 Therefore, the taxpayers appealed to the BTA, which held
that the taxpayers had no taxable gain.157 The Commissioner appealed to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals which held that the BTA’s position was not supported by
the applicable statutes or regulations and, that as a matter of law, the BTA was
wrong.158
Although the Revenue Act of 1926 empowered the courts of appeals to modify or
reverse the BTA if its decision was not “in accordance with law,” the United States
Supreme Court found that the BTA had decided an issue of fact and not an issue of
law, and the BTA’s findings with regard to issues of fact should be accorded the
same finality as that accorded to other administrative agencies.159 The Court
acknowledged that during the BTA’s tenure, the reviewing courts, including the
Supreme Court itself, had not always “paid the scrupulous deference to the tax laws’
admonitions of finality which they have to similar provisions in statutes relating to
other tribunals.”160 The Court found that this lack of deference to the BTA’s
findings of fact was not the result of deliberate judicial or legislative policy but,
rather, resulted from historical peculiarities as to the development of tax
administration: to wit, (1) jurisdiction to resolve tax disputes resided initially only in
the district courts, and (2) during the first few years of the BTA’s existence, its
findings were not final, but were only prima facie evidence at a later trial in the
district courts.161
With regard to the first historical peculiarity, the courts of appeals give the
district courts less deference with regard to its findings of fact than that accorded
administrative agencies. However, after the Revenue Act of 1926 empowered
parties to appeal the BTA’s findings directly to the circuit courts, the courts of
appeals were receiving tax cases from two different sources: the BTA (deficiency
determinations) and the district courts (refund cases). Therefore, it was “more
difficult to maintain sharp separation of court and administrative functions in tax
than in other fields.”162 In other words, the courts of appeals tended to review tax
cases with the same degree of deference regardless of whether the case had
originated in the BTA—an administrative agency entitled to more deference—or the
district courts.
With regard to the second historical peculiarity, the Supreme Court noted that
oftentimes the legislation that empowers the courts to review agency action also
156

Id. at 491-92.

157

Id. at 492.

158

Id.

159

Id. The United States Supreme Court noted that the Revenue Act of 1928, § 272 (g), 45
Stat. 854, provided that the BTA “in redetermining a deficiency in respect of any taxable year
shall consider such facts with relation to the taxes for other taxable years as may be necessary
correctly to redetermine the amount of such deficiency.” Id. at 493.
160

Id. at 494.

161

Id. at 495-97.

162

Id. at 495.
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contains limitations on the courts’ scope of review.163 Tax administration and the
BTA did not evolve in this fashion. As far back as the income tax imposed during
the Civil War, taxpayers had to pay a disputed tax and then sue for a refund in the
federal courts. The Revenue Act of 1913 also had not provided for any
administrative review of the Bureau’s assessment of liabilities. It was not until
1923, when Congress created the BTA, that taxpayers had recourse to an
independent administrative agency, and, even then, the BTA’s findings of fact were
not final, but rather, were only prima facie evidence in a later trial.164 Finally, in
1926—thirteen years after the income tax was first enacted—the BTA became an
administrative agency whose findings were entitled to the same finality as that of
other agencies.165 Therefore, between 1913 and 1926, the courts had been given the
time to develop and establish their own way of thinking about and approaching tax
issues, and the courts were in the habit of reviewing findings of fact without
restraint.166
Nevertheless, in light of the specialized nature of tax combined with the BTA’s
and Tax Court of the United States’s independence from the Bureau, the Supreme
Court held that it was highly appropriate that the findings of fact be given the
deference due an administrative agency. The Supreme Court emphasized that this is
required by the goals of consistency, uniformity, and expedition of resolution that
are the hallmark of agency action.167
The court is independent, and its neutrality is not clouded by prosecuting
duties. Its procedures assure fair hearings. Its deliberations are evidenced
by careful opinions. . . . It has established a tradition of freedom from bias
and pressures. It deals with a subject that is highly specialized and so
complex as to be the despair of judges. It is relatively better staffed for its
task than is the judiciary. . . . Individual cases are disposed of wholly on
records publicly made, in adversary proceedings, and the court has no
responsibility for previous handling. Tested by every theoretical and
practical reason for administrative finality, no administrative decisions are
entitled to higher credit in the courts. Consideration of uniform and
expeditious tax administrations require that they be given all credit to
which they are entitled under the law.168
E. Enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act
In 1946, Congress enacted the APA.169 The APA prescribed procedures for
agency action and for judicial review of agency action. The APA can be roughly
163

Id. at 496.

164

Id. at 497.

165

Id.

166

Id. at 497-98.

167

Id. at 499.

168

Id.

169

Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§
551-99, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2006)).
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divided into two sections: (1) those specifying the procedures agencies are to use
when performing their rulemaking or adjudicatory functions, and (2) those
specifying the standards courts are to employ when reviewing agency action.170 (It is
important to keep in mind that Congress intended the APA to control agencies and
courts only in the absence of a more specific statutory structure).171
Section 2 of the APA defines an “agency” as “each authority of the Government
of the United States” other than Congress, the courts, or the governments of the
possessions, Territories, or the District of Columbia.172 One of the issues about
which Congress had been concerned was the status of the Tax Court of the United
States (which despite its title remained an administrative agency) and of the
legislative courts such as the Claims Court—would these entities be considered
“courts” and hence exempt from the APA’s provisions regarding agency
adjudication procedures? The drafters of the APA had originally contemplated that
most agency adjudication would be formal and would, therefore, be conducted in
accordance with the trial-type procedures specified in APA sections 554, 556, and
557. Congress was concerned that these legislative courts and judicial-type agencies
continue to act in accordance with the formal procedures already in place for them
through their specific enabling legislation; and further that these entities continue to
act in a judicial capacity only and not be forced to engage in prosecutorial or
investigatory activities.
Attorney General Tom Clark advised the Senate Judiciary Committee that
“‘Courts’ includes The Tax Court, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Court
of Claims, and similar courts. This act does not apply to their procedure nor affect
the requirement of resort thereto.”173 Congress was concerned that these judicial
entities not be deemed agencies under the sections of the APA specifying agency
adjudicatory procedures because these entities already had procedures in place.
With regard to judicial review of agency action, section 706 of the APA specifies
the different standards and scope that courts are to employ when reviewing agency
action (unless Congress has specified some other standard or scope is to be
employed instead). The legislative history explaining when the reviewing court
should use de novo review actually uses the Tax Court of the United States as an
example.174 The Bureau was not required to use formal adjudication procedures
170

5 U.S.C. §§ 551-57 (2006) of the APA detail the procedures agencies are to follow for
rulemaking and formal adjudication; §§ 701-06 govern judicial review.
171

5 U.S.C. § 703.

172

5 U.S.C. § 551.

173

S. DOC. NO. 79-248 (1946) (letter from Att’y Gen. Tom C. Clark), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 224 (1946). Interestingly, the
Congressional Record also contains the discussion or address of Mr. Allen Moore, “a
prominent member of the Colorado bar,” who refers to the Tax Court of the United States as a
“legislative court” when discussing the APA’s provisions for judicial review of agency action.
S. DOC. NO. 79-248 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 334 (1946) (“There is an introductory limitation by which there is excluded
any matter subject to a subsequent trial de novo or judicial review in any legislative court such
as the Customs Court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Tax Court, or the Court
of Claims.”).
174
Id. (report of Senate Judiciary Committee), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 213-14 (1946).
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when determining a taxpayer’s liability because Bureau determinations with regard
to tax liability were subject to de novo review before the Tax Court.175 Therefore, it
would be redundant to require the Bureau of Internal Revenue to hold a formal
hearing to make findings of fact if the same matter would be heard de novo in the
Tax Court, which would make its own findings of fact. The sections of the APA
regarding formal hearing requirements at the agency level dovetail with the sections
of the APA regarding judicial review of agency action.
Section 10(E) provides for the scope of court review and provides in pertinent
part as follows:
Reviewing courts are required to decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of any agency action. They must (A) compel
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed and (B) hold
unlawful any action, findings, or conclusions found to be . . . (6)
unwarranted by the facts so far as the latter are subject to trial de novo.176
With regard to the sixth category—trial de novo—the Report of the House Judiciary
Committee specifically referred to the Tax Court of the United States as fitting
within that category.
The sixth category, respecting the establishment of facts upon trial de
novo, would require the reviewing court to determine the facts in any case
of adjudication not subject to sections 7 and 8 [formal hearing
requirements] or otherwise required to be reviewed exclusively on the
record of a statutory agency hearing. . . . [T]he test is whether there has
been a statutory administrative hearing of the facts which is adequate and
exclusive for purposes of review. Thus, adjudications such as tax
assessments not made upon a statutory administrative hearing and record
may involve a trial of the facts in The Tax Court or the United States
district courts.177

175

Id. (Senate Judiciary Print, June 1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 21-22 (1946).

OF THE

[Section 5] defines generally the procedure for the administrative adjudication of
particular cases. The introductory clause removes from the operation of sections 5, 7,
and 8 [(the formal adjudication requirements)] all administrative procedures in which
Congress has not required orders to be made upon a hearing, and the first of the
further exceptions eliminates matters subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the
facts de novo in any court. . . . The exception of matters subject to a subsequent trial of
the law and the facts de novo in any court exempts such matters as the tax functions of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (which are triable de novo in The Tax Court).
Id.
176

SCOPE

OF

REVIEW, S. DOC. NO. 79-248 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
278 (1946).

OF

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
177

S. DOC. NO. 79-248 (1946) (report of House Judiciary Committee), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 279 (1946); see also id.
(report of the Senate Judiciary Committee), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 214 (1946).
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In other words, not only was the Tax Court of the United States not exempt from the
APA but, rather, was used as an example of how section 706(e) of the APA was
intended to operate. Further, section 706(e) of the APA also referred to the federal
district courts regarding tax assessments. The Tax Court’s recent statement, that the
above provision is further proof that the Tax Court is exempt from the APA, is not
entirely logical. Section 706 of the APA refers to the United States District Courts,
which hear refund cases de novo. Despite the fact that district courts also act as trial
courts hearing matters de novo, such as tax refund suits, the district courts, at times,
also function as reviewing courts subject to the APA’s procedures. In fact, section
702 of the APA refers to the reviewing courts, which is interpreted as meaning the
district courts. Yet, no one argues that the district courts are not reviewing courts,
subject to section 706 of the APA, when performing judicial review of agency
action.
Shortly after Congress enacted the APA, the Sixth Circuit, in a series of cases,
held that the APA enlarged the ability of the appellate court to review factual
findings made by the Tax Court of the United States despite the United States
Supreme Court decision in Dobson. In Lincoln Electric Co. v. Commissioner178 the
taxpayer sought to deduct as ordinary and necessary business expenses premiums
paid on employees’ retirement annuity policies and employees’ trust funds.179 The
Internal Revenue Service had disallowed the deductions, and the Tax Court of the
United States sustained that position.180 On appeal, the Internal Revenue Service
argued that whether the payments were ordinary and necessary business expenses
was an issue of fact, and, that as long as the Tax Court of the United States’ position
had any substantial basis in the evidence, the Sixth Circuit was bound to uphold the
Tax Court’s position under Dobson.181 In contrast, the taxpayer argued that the Sixth
Circuit could review the Tax Court’s factual findings because the recently-enacted
APA rendered Dobson obsolete.182 The Internal Revenue Service argued that the
taxpayer was mistaken as to the applicability of the APA because the Act
specifically exempts courts, and, according to the Attorney General, the Tax Court of
the United States would be considered a court for purposes of applying the Act.183
The Sixth Circuit held that the deductibility of the premiums was an issue of law,
not fact,184 but went on to state that, despite the Attorney General’s position, the Tax
Court of the United States was an agency, and that the APA had expanded the Sixth
Circuit’s powers of review with regard to issues of fact.
The Board of Tax Appeals was, however, by the language of the
statute creating it . . . an independent agency in the executive branch of
the government. It was so held in Old Colony v. Com’r . . . . When by §
504(a) of the Revenue Act of 1942, its name was changed to the Tax
178

Lincoln Electric Co. v. Comm’r, 162 F.2d 379 (6th Cir. 1947).

179

Id. at 379-80.

180

Id. at 379.

181

Id. at 381.

182

Id. at 382.

183

Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 38 (1945).

184

Lincoln Electric Co., 162 F.2d at 383.
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Court of the United States, the Act expressly provided: ‘the jurisdiction,
powers, and duties of the The Tax Court shall be the same as by existing
law provided in the case of the Board of Tax Appeals.’ . . . When the
Supreme Court came to consider, in Com’r v. Gooch Milling & Elevator
Co. . . . the jurisdiction of the Board of Tax Appeals to order a refund or
credit a prior overpayment against a deficiency, it concluded that the
Board possessed no power to grant equitable recoupment as did tribunals
having general equity jurisdiction, for the Board . . . is but an independent
agency in the Executive Branch of the Government. That case was
decided in December, 1943, after the Board of Tax Appeals had become
the Tax Court of the United States. . . . While our conclusion is that
review of Tax Court decisions is governed by the Administrative
Procedures Act, it does not become necessary, in view of our reliance
upon the Bingham case, to particularize in what respect our power to
review has been enlarged, except to say that it doubtless has been
broadened and that it will be time enough to consider the precise
application of the Act when clear-cut questions of fact or mixed questions
of fact and law are brought to us for review.185
In two subsequent cases, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its position that it could review
the Tax Court of the United States under the standards set forth in the APA.186
In 1948, Congress changed the standard under which appellate courts would
review Tax Court of the United States’ decisions, thereby effectively overruling
Dobson. Henceforth, appellate courts’ scope of review would be the same as appeals
from district courts’ decisions tried without a jury.187
F. United States Tax Court
From 1943 to 1967, Congress considered changing the Tax Court of the United
States’ status from an agency in the executive branch to an Article III court.188
Proponents of the change argued that Article III status would finally resolve and
remove the confusion that periodically had cropped up as to the application of the
APA to the Tax Court of the United States. Further, Article III status would give the
court more prestige and attract highly qualified persons to serve, although both the
BTA and the Tax Court of the United States were highly regarded.189
185

Id. at 382 (quotations omitted).

186

See Dawson v. Comm’r, 163 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1947); Lawton v. Comm’r, 164 F.2d
380 (6th Cir. 1947).
187

Housing and Rent Act of 1948, ch. 646, § 36, 62 Stat. 99 (codified at I.R.C. § 7482
(2006)); see Steve R. Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why
Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court Decisions Is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REV. 235,
236 (1998) (considering whether, as a practical matter, the appellate courts still follow Dobson
and why heightened deference is undesirable).
188

See A Proposal to Give the Tax Court Article III Status: Hearings on S. 2041 Before the
S. Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong. 13-19 (1968) (describing the history of the Tax Court and containing a chronology of
the legislation introduced since 1924 to change the status of the Tax Court to an Article III
court).
189

DUBROFF, supra note 70, at 206.
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However, the proposed change encountered substantial opposition from several
quarters. If the Tax Court of the United States became an Article III court, it no
longer would be under the jurisdiction of the House Means and Way Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee, but instead, would be under the authority of the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees leading to turf wars between congressional
members. The Department of Treasury was opposed because of its concern that the
Department of Justice would take over the task of representing the United States
before the Article III court instead of the attorneys from the Office of Chief Counsel
in the Internal Revenue Service.190 Taxpayer representatives were opposed out of
concerns that accountants would no longer be permitted to represent taxpayers
before the Article III court. (Accountants represented taxpayers more often back
then). Finally, the United States Judicial Conference opposed the change on the
ground that it was inappropriate for a judge in a court of such specialized jurisdiction
to have Article III status.
As a last minute compromise, the Tax Reform Act of 1969191 was amended, and
the Tax Court of the United States was changed from an independent agency to a
legislative court entitled “The United States Tax Court” (Tax Court) created under
Article I of the Constitution.192 In order to further assure taxpayers of the Tax
Court’s independence from the IRS and the Treasury Department, Congress also
provided funds for the construction of a new courthouse in which to house the Tax
Court.
After the Tax Court became a legislative court, Chief Judge William F. Drennen
issued an order that the Tax Court’s notices, orders, rules, and other public
documents were no longer subject to the APA’s requirements that such items be
published in the Federal Registrar and also ordered that the Code of Federal
Regulations delete provisions dealing with the Tax Court (because the Tax Court
was no longer an agency).193
190

Usually, the Department of Justice represents the United States in court and does so in
tax refund cases in District Court and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims; however, the
Department of Treasury (Office of Chief Counsel in the Internal Revenue Service) has always
represented the government in cases heard in the BTA, the Tax Court of the United States, and
the United States Tax Court. This dichotomy arose because taxpayer appeals initially were
heard by the Committee on Appeals and Review, which was part of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, and was an informal process conducted between the taxpayer, the Committee, and
the Bureau’s representatives. See Johnson, supra note 187, at 242 n.31 (providing a more
detailed explanation as to the government’s representation on tax matters before the various
courts, including the bankruptcy courts).
191

Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730 (amending I.R.C. §
7441 (1954)).
192

See Fahey, supra note 22, at 479-80.

193

Tax Court of the United States: Deletion of Chapter, 35 Fed. Reg. 12462 (1970).

Whereas the Tax Reform Act of 1969 . . . amending section 7441 of the Internal
Revenue Code, established the U.S. Tax Court as a court of record under article I of
the Constitution of the United States; and
Whereas, publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER of the Court’s public notices, orders,
rules, and other public documents is no longer within the purview of the
Administrative Procedure Act:
Now, therefore, the material appearing under Chapter II, Title 26 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, is deleted, and the codification determinations assigned to the
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Shortly after becoming an Article I court, the Tax Court decided Nappi v.
Commissioner194 wherein the Tax Court stated that “since the United States Tax
Court is a court of record established under Article I of the Constitution of the
United States, the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are not applicable
to Tax Court procedures or jurisdiction.”195 The taxpayer had received a notice of
deficiency from the IRS but had failed to file his petition with the Tax Court within
the ninety-day period required for the Tax Court to be able to exercise jurisdiction
over the petition.196 The taxpayer argued that, nevertheless, the Tax Court could
exercise jurisdiction because “the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are
controlling in this situation and supplant the requirements of section 6213(a), so as to
confer jurisdiction on the Tax Court to hear and decide this income tax
controversy.”197 Although it is not entirely clear from the opinion, it appears that the
taxpayer was endeavoring to use sections 702, 703, and 704 of the APA to argue that
the Tax Court could exercise jurisdiction.198
The Tax Court could have—and should have—reasoned that because Congress
had already prescribed when and how the Tax Court could acquire jurisdiction over a
Court in its former status under the executive branch of the Government are
relinquished.
This action is effective upon publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER.
Id.
194

Nappi v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 282 (1972).

195

Id. at 282.

196

Id. at 283; I.R.C. §§ 6213(a), 7502 (1954) (providing that the petition must be filed
within ninety days).
197

Nappi, 58 T.C. at 283.

198

5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) provides that a person who is seeking relief from agency action
may seek judicial review.
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United States
seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an
officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under
color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the
ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an
indispensable party.
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 703 provides that “[t]he form of proceeding for judicial review is the special
statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in
the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action . . . in a court of
competent jurisdiction.” A “court of competent jurisdiction” usually refers to the district
courts but because the “special statutory review proceeding” here—I.R.C. §6213(a) provides
that the Tax Court should hear the matter, and the Tax Court would be the appropriate court.
5 U.S.C. § 704 provides that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review.”
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deficiency proceeding, the APA’s provisions were inapposite. Instead, the Tax
Court argued that the APA’s provisions apply to an “agency” of the Government, but
specifically exclude “the courts of the United States,”199 and, because the Tax Court
was an Article I court, the APA did not apply to the Tax Court. However, the APA
provisions to which the Tax Court referred are those contained in sections 551
through 559, which control agency adjudication and rulemaking and not judicial
review by the courts. It is true that because the Tax Court was a court it was not
subject to those APA provisions that dictate how, in the absence of other
Congressional direction, an agency should perform rulemaking or formal
adjudication. However, the APA’s provisions regarding judicial review contained in
sections 701 through 706 apply to courts in the absence of Congressional directive
regarding the conduct of judicial review of agency action. Therefore, the reason that
the taxpayer could not invoke the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over his deficiency
petition was because he had failed to comply with the statutorily-mandated process
for doing so200 and not because the APA could not apply to the Tax Court.
In addition, the Tax Court referred to prior case law in support of its position:
O’Dwyer v. Commissioner,201 Anderson v. Commissioner,202 and Kennedy Name
Plate Co. v. Commissioner,203 stating that these cases held “that the Administrative
Procedure Act did not apply to the Tax Court before the Tax Reform Act of 1969.”204
However, that is an overly broad reading of those three cases, and they did not
specifically hold that the APA did not apply to the Tax Court. Indeed, in Kennedy
Name Plate Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that the APA
might well apply at times.205 The Ninth Circuit also held that the taxpayer was not
entitled to a hearing before the entire panel of the Tax Court of the United States
because its enabling legislation permitted one judge to hear and dispose of a
matter.206 With regard to Anderson, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had
199

5 U.S.C. § 551(1).

200

I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2006).

201

O’Dwyer v. Comm’r, 266 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1959).

202

Anderson v. Comm’r, 164 F.2d 870 (7th Cir. 1947).

203

Kennedy Name Plate Co. v. Comm’r, 170 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1948).

204

Nappi, 58 T.C. at 284.

205

Kennedy Name Plate Co., 170 F.2d at 198.

206

Id. at 198-99. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the APA specifically states that it does
not repeal specific grants of authority. Congress specifically provided that the entire panel of
the Tax Court of the United States need not decide a case. Again, it is significant to note that
the Ninth Circuit did not say that the APA does not apply to the Tax Court of the United
States but, rather, that the APA itself authorized the use of a different procedure.
To begin with it is to be observed that Sec. 2 of the Act, after defining the term
“agency,” provides that “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to repeal delegations
of authority as provided by law.” Turning to the statute relating to the organization
and procedure of the Tax Court, we note a provision authorizing the presiding judge to
divide the Court into divisions of one or more members. Section 1118(a) of 26
U.S.C.A. provides that “A division shall hear, and make a determination upon, any
proceeding instituted before the Tax Court and any motion in connection therewith,
assigned to such division by the presiding judge, and shall make a report of any such
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simply held that it did not matter whether it reviewed the “whole record,” as
provided in APA section 706, because substantial evidence supported the Tax Court
of the United States’ determination under any standard.207
In O’Dwyer, the Fourth Circuit affirmed that when the Tax Court conducts
deficiency hearings, it is a trial court hearing evidence de novo and is not confined to
the record compiled by the IRS during its administrative proceedings.208 Therefore,
O’Dwyer fails to shed light on the standards governing the Tax Court when it
conducts collection due process hearings or other review of agency action.
In O’Dwyer, the IRS contended that the husband and wife taxpayers had failed to
include certain items in gross income. William O’Dwyer had been the mayor of
New York from 1945 to 1950, after which time he served as ambassador to
Mexico.209 The IRS determined that when he was running for re-election as mayor
in 1949, William O’Dwyer had received $10,000 from the Uniformed Firemen’s
Association, ostensibly as a campaign contribution.210 In fact, the evidence indicated
that Mr. O’Dwyer received the $10,000 for his personal use.211 The IRS also
determined that while Mr. O’Dwyer was ambassador to Mexico, his wife, Sloan
O’Dwyer, had deposited $1,500 into a personal bank account, the source of which
funds she could not satisfactorily explain.212
The O’Dwyers appealed the IRS’s deficiency determination to the Tax Court of
the United States, which, after making some adjustments to the amount due to allow
for some deductions, upheld the IRS’s deficiency determination.213 The Tax Court
also refused to enforce two subpoenas duce tecum that the O’Dwyers had managed
to procure, which required the IRS to turn over the revenue agents’ reports. Revenue
agents’ reports are confidential files compiled by the revenue agents during the
course of investigating a taxpayer’s deficiency.214 The O’Dwyers argued that the
determination which constitutes its final disposition of the proceeding.” (Emphasis
supplied.) By subdivision (b) of the same section the report of the division becomes
the report of the Tax Court within thirty days after such report, “unless within such
period the presiding judge has directed that such report shall be reviewed by the Tax
Court.”
The comparable provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, as found in Sec. 7
thereof, states that “nothing in this Act shall be deemed to supersede the conduct of
specified classes of proceedings in whole or in part by or before boards or other
officers specially provided for by or designated pursuant to statute.”
We conclude that the relevant procedure of the Tax Court, as prescribed specifically
by law, and as followed here, is not affected by the Administrative Procedure Act.
Id. (citation omitted).
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revenue agent reports were part of the IRS record, and, therefore, the Tax Court was
obligated to consider those reports according to section 706 of the APA; however,
the Tax Court disagreed.
This Court is not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. We do not
review in the same sense as other courts perhaps review actions of the
Federal Communications Commission or some other federal agency. We
do not review in that same manner the determinations of the
Commissioner. This is a trial ‘de novo’ and the question before me is
simply whether or not the deficiencies determined by the Commissioner
are correct.215
The O’Dwyers appealed, and among their contentions was that the Tax Court had
erred in refusing to enforce the two subpoenas duce tecum because the APA required
the IRS to turn over these reports to the taxpayers and the Tax Court for its review
when rendering its decision.216 The O’Dwyers argued that the IRS’s determination
was subject to judicial review in accordance with section 706 of the APA, that the
Tax Court was a reviewing court subject to the provisions of section 706, and that
section 706 requires the Tax Court to review the “whole record” upon which the IRS
based its determination, which would include the revenue agents’ reports.217
The Fourth Circuit held that the O’Dwyers had misinterpreted the APA. When
Congress requires an agency to hold a hearing in accordance with sections 554
through 557 of the APA, the agency must employ formal, trial-type procedures and
create a formal record, which includes all the testimony and other evidence that the
parties presented and on which the agency based its decision.218 If either party
appeals, the reviewing court must confine its review to that formal record and cannot
consider other evidence.219 However, the IRS was not (and is not) subject to sections
554 through 557 of the APA when dealing with taxpayers.220
The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act must be read and
construed together and we hold that the judicial review of the ‘whole
record’ mentioned in section [706(e)] envisages, in the case of
adjudication, a review of the record made in cases wherein Sections [554,
556, and 557] are applicable.
Where these sections apply, the
administrative agency is required to hold a formal hearing within a strict
statutory framework and to make up a record of the testimony and
exhibits introduced thereat, upon which record the agency must base its
decision. This formal record is the subject of the review provided in Sec.
[706]. To hold that Sec. [706] applies to a determination of the
Commissioner and that the Tax Court is a ‘reviewing court’, within the
meaning of that section, would be to hold that such determination is
215

O’Dwyer, 266 F.2d at 579.
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subject to the rigid requirements of Secs. [554, 556, and 557]. Without a
‘record’ to review, the provisions of Sec. [706] would be meaningless and
thus inapplicable here.
It has been held that the Bureau of Internal Revenue is exempt from
the requirements of Secs. [554, 556, and 557] of the Administrative
Procedure Act. The Tax Court is given jurisdiction to redetermine the
deficiency asserted by the Commissioner, and in doing so it is empowered
to prescribe rules of practice and procedure and is required to apply the
rules of evidence applicable to nonjury trials in the United States Court of
the District of Columbia and make findings of fact upon such evidence.
The Tax Court thus renders its decision only upon the evidence produced
before it. . . .
The Tax Court, rather than being a ‘reviewing court’, within the
meaning of Sec. [706] reviewing the ‘record’, is a court in which the facts
are triable de novo and the burden is upon the taxpayer to come forward
with evidence showing the determination of deficiency to be erroneous.
We agree that the Tax Court is not subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act.221
IV. SPECIALIZED COURT STATUS AND THE APA
A. Article I v. Article III Courts: The Distinction
The mere fact that the Tax Court and the district courts are not in harmony as to
the applicability of the APA to collection due process appeals is not a sufficient
justification for imposing the APA on the Tax Court. A taxpayer arguing a
deficiency before the Tax Court does not have the matter heard in accordance with
the same procedures and rights as a taxpayer arguing a refund before the district
court.222 This discrepancy has been upheld by the courts, which recognize that
deficiency hearings and refund hearings serve different purposes and spring from
different statutory schemes. Collection due process appeals, however, do arise from
a common statutory root: I.R.C. section 6330. There is nothing in the statute itself,
nor its legislative history, to indicate that Congress intended or anticipated that there
would be any difference in how the appeals were conducted, whether before the Tax
Court or the district court.
One then must consider whether the Tax Court’s Article I status, or the fact that
it is a court of specialized jurisdiction, renders the APA inapplicable; that is to say,
one must ask if there is something about the nature of an Article I or a specialized
Article III court that makes it inappropriate for the APA to apply.
Article III of the Constitution states that the “judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.”223 The Justices of the Supreme Court
and the inferior federal courts “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall . . . receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
221
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during their Continuance in Office.”224 It is important to note that, although the
Constitution does not obligate Congress to create inferior federal tribunals, the
Constitution demands that if Congress chooses to do so, the judges must have their
salary and tenure protected.225
Read literally, Article III appears to require that the judicial power must reside
only in federal tribunals whose judges must enjoy tenure and salary protection.
However, even the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that Article III
would be interpreted so narrowly.226 For example, the first Congress enacted
legislation authorizing the executive branch to resolve disputes involving claims to
veterans’ benefits and customs duties.227
From time to time Congress has created courts to hear specific matters and whose
judges sit for fixed terms, and they do not enjoy salary and tenure protection.
Congress usually creates these non-Article III tribunals pursuant to one of its
enumerated powers under Article I of the Constitution together with the necessary
and proper clause contained therein.228 These federal courts are referred to as
legislative courts or Article I courts. The United States Tax Court is an Article I
court, as is the United States Court for Federal Claims.229 As far back as 1828, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the use of non-Article III tribunals under
224

Id.

225

See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 1.1–1.4.6. (3d ed. 1999)
(explaining Article III’s provisions and the early history of the federal courts).
226

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article
III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 916, 919-21 (1988). Professor Fallon posits that there are three
problems with literalism: (1) The early history indicates that Congress did not construe Article
III literally. The first Congress vested power in the executive to hear disputes regarding
customs and veterans’ benefits. (2) Literalism raises policy concerns in our modern
administrative state. At the time the Constitution was adopted, the federal government was
very limited in its functions. However, our modern government has created entitlements and
assumed responsibility for enforcing a broader range of legal rights. Literalism would
frustrate these interests that Congress has sought to advance through the use of non-Article III
tribunals. (3) A literal reading of Article III is incompatible with, and would lead to the
rejection of, an enormous amount of case law and current practice (although stare decisis is
entitled to less deference with regard to constitutional issues). Id.
227
See, e.g., Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95 (military benefits); see Act of Sept. 1,
1789, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 55 (customs duties).
228

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1-18. Although non-Article III tribunals are created
pursuant to Congress’s enumerated powers under Article I, this is not always the case. Id.
For example, territorial courts are created pursuant to Congress’s power under Article IV,
section 3 of the Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
229

Other Article I courts include the Court of Private Land Claims created by Congress in
1891 to resolve claims to land based on Spanish and Mexican grants to land later ceded to the
United States from Mexico. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 539, 26 Stat. 854. The Choctaw and
Chickasaw Citizenship Courts were designed to resolve claims to membership in the tribes,
which would affect the right to previously allocated lands and funds. Act of July 1, 1902, ch.
641, 32 Stat. 641. See Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40
AM. U. L. REV. 1003 (1991).
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certain circumstances. In American Insurance Co. v. 365 Bales of Cotton,230 the
United States Supreme Court considered the constitutional status of a court created
for the territory of Florida, which was not yet a state. Chief Justice Marshall, who
wrote the opinion, held that Congress had the power to create non-Article III courts
and upheld the constitutionality of the territorial court.
These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts . . . . They are legislative
Courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in
the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to
make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging
to the United States.231
Article I courts function as courts in their application of law to facts in order to
render opinions; however, they do not have “inherent powers” but only such powers
as are given to them by statute.232 They are courts of specialized, as opposed to
general jurisdiction such as the federal district courts.233
However, not all courts created under Article III of the United States Constitution
have general subject matter jurisdiction. Congress has created a number of Article
III courts that have specialized jurisdiction. For example, in 1956, Congress
established the Court of International Trade as an Article III court.234 The Court of
International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over case disputes between the federal
government and private citizens with regard to import transactions.235 In 1978,
Congress created both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign
Surveillance Court of Review.236 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is
empowered to hear applications for orders approving electronic surveillance to
gather foreign intelligence information. It is staffed by district court judges who take
230

Am. Ins. Co. v. 365 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828).

231

Id. at 546. See also Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax
Court’s Exercise of Equitable Powers Constitutional?, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 357, 363 (2001).
Professor Lederman notes that it is arguable that the United States Supreme Court recognized
the legitimacy of legislative courts even earlier in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 162
(1803), where the Court recognizes the right of William Marbury to his five-year term as a
Justice of Peace for the District of Columbia, thereby allowing the exercise of judicial power
without life tenure. Lederman, supra, at 363.
232

Lederman, supra note 231, at 369 n.61 (citing in support In re Hessinger & Assocs., 192
B.R. 211, 215 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Because the bankruptcy courts are creatures of Article I,
they have no ‘inherent’ powers and their jurisdiction is limited to that expressly granted by
Congress.”).
233

In 1875, Congress authorized the federal district courts to hear cases arising under the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat.
470. This grant of general federal question jurisdiction is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
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Act of July 14, 1956, ch. 589, 70 Stat. 532. The Court of International Trade is the
successor to the Board of General Appraisers, which was created to reduce the district courts
and also to promote uniformity in customs cases. In 1926, the Board’s name was changed to
the United States Customs Court. Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, 44 Stat. 669.
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28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-85.
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11).
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turns sitting on the court located in the District of Columbia. The Foreign
Surveillance Court of Review hears appeals from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court and is staffed by three appellate court judges, who sit for terms.237
The Emergency Court of Appeals was established in 1942 to review regulations and
orders issued by the Office of Price Administration.238 The Office of Price
Administration and the Emergency Court of Appeals were designed to control rising
domestic prices after the United States entered World War II. The Emergency Court
of Appeals was terminated in 1961.
The Tax Court is not a court created by Congress under Article III of the United
States Constitution.239 Rather, the Tax Court is a specialized court created by
Congress pursuant to one of its powers enumerated in Article I of the United States
Constitution240 and the necessary and proper clause also contained therein.241
Because the Tax Court is a legislative or Article I court, it “is a court of limited
jurisdiction, and . . . may exercise . . . jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by
Congress.”242
B. Specialized Courts Subject to the APA
Congress, when empowering an Article I or specialized Article III court, will
provide in the enabling legislation what authority and powers the courts may
exercise. This makes sense; after all, the very purpose of an Article I court or a
specialized Article III court is to hear a particular matter such as tariff disputes or
contract claims against the government. However, if the Article I or specialized
Article III court is acting as a reviewing court, and if a special statutory proceeding
does not exist or the special statutory proceeding is inadequate, the APA can and
should function as a gap-filler.243 The Supreme Court has not found any
constitutional or statutory impediment to an Article I or specialized Article III court
turning to the APA, and, in fact, the Supreme Court has held that the federal courts
must turn to the APA if Congress has not specified otherwise.
In Dickinson v. Zurko,244 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a specialized Article III court, which had reviewed
factual findings of the Patent and Trademark Office’s under a “clearly erroneous
standard.” The clearly erroneous standard is a more stringent review standard than
the APA’s substantial evidence standard, which is used to review formal agency
237

See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, Apr. 2, 1990, at 187-89.
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Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 31, 56 Stat. 23, amended by Inflation Control Act of 1942, ch.
578, 56 Stat. 765.
239
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”).
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-17.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See discussion supra Part III.F.
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Meyer v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 417, 420 (2000) (citing I.R.C. § 7442; Judge v. Comm’r,
88 T.C. 1175, 1180-81 (1987); Naftel v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985)).
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5 U.S.C. § 703 (2006).
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Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
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adjudications.245 The Supreme Court held that “a reviewing court must apply the
APA’s court/agency review standards in the absence of an exception.”246 The
Supreme Court noted that to hold otherwise would frustrate the purposes of the
APA, which was to bring consistency to the conduct of judicial review.
Recognizing the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to
judicial review of administrative action, see, e.g., Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); 92
Cong. Rec. 5654 (1946) (statement of Rep. Walter), we have closely
examined the Federal Circuit’s claim for an exception to that uniformity.
In doing so, we believe that respondents must show more than a
possibility of a heightened standard, and indeed more than even a bare
preponderance of evidence in their favor. Existence of the additional
requirement must be clear. This is suggested both by the phrase
“recognized by law” and by the congressional specification in the APA
that “[n]o subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the
provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so
expressly.” § 12, 60 Stat. 244, 5 U.S.C. § 559. A statutory intent that
legislative departure from the norm must be clear suggests a need for
similar clarity in respect to grandfathered common-law variations. The
APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and
diversity. It would frustrate that purpose to permit divergence on the
basis of a requirement “recognized” only as ambiguous.247
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, a predecessor to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,248 had
used a heightened court/court standard of review prior to the enactment of the APA.
The Supreme Court found that, in fact, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had
used the more deferential court/agency substantial evidence standard, not the
heightened clearly erroneous standard. It is significant that the Supreme Court did
not make mention, or even consider if there were, any constitutional or statutory
impediment to subjecting these courts to the APA.
V. CONCLUSION
Commentators and several federal courts of appeals have argued that the Tax
Court should fill in the gaps in its statutory authority for collection due process
appeals by turning to traditional administrative law jurisprudence, including the
APA. Doing so would promote consistency and predictability to the Tax Court’s
judicial review of the IRS’s collection due process hearings, thus rendering the
process fairer for all of the participants. By adhering to traditional administrative
law jurisprudence and the strictures of the APA, the Tax Court would be acting in
245

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).

246

Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 154.
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Id. at 154-55.
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The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals at various times was deemed by the Supreme
Court to be an Article I court or an Article III court. In the time period immediately before the
APA’s enactment, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was considered to be an Article I
court by the Supreme Court.
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accordance with the values this body of law is designed to implement: uniformity in
procedure. Further, a review of the Tax Court’s and the APA’s history reveals that
the Tax Court and its predecessors were not exceptions to the APA’s requirements
but, rather, they were consistently viewed as within the APA’s purview.
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